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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
The parties to this appeal are Join) A. Lyon, plaintii I anu apjviiam. aiu. i MI.4. ,
Bryan, M.D., defendant and appellee.
.WKISmCNOlN AM) INA'lliRK OK PROCEEDINGS
i his is an appeal from an order denying appellant I AOII'S motion for a new trial
and, purport edK. an appeal from the jury's "no cause*" .uu.vi. entered r;> :k, Second
Judicial DistiiU i ouri. U-UCL i.-^i.vn 1uiliii;,!-

:

' was

i ''.^:1 pursuant to Utah Lode Ann. § ^8 \-3-l02(3)

(West 201 Uj 11 was transferred to this Court under the supreme court's "pourover'*
oriix, l-tah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(4) and 7N
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL,
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
and
ISSUE PRESERVATION
For reasons that will be apparent in the Argument section of this brief, Appellee
Dr. Bryan frames the issues on appeal in a different order, and in different form, than
does appellant Lyon:
I. Did the trial court properly deny appellant Lyon's motion for a new trial?
When a motion for a new trial is based upon a claim of "insufficient evidence," a
trial court's denial of such motion is reviewed deferentially on appeal, for abuse of
discretion, and will be reversed only if there is "no reasonable basis for the decision."
E.g., Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) {"Crookston
IF). This issue was preserved by appellant Lyon's post-verdict motion for a new trial.
II. Should this Court decline to independently review the sufficiency of the
evidence, either in deference to the trial court's decision on appellant's motion for a
new trial, or because such review is procedurally barred?
This issue is, in part, one of appellate policy that, by definition, could not be
presented to the trial court, and must be decided de novo by this Court. A procedural
default argument was raised in appellee Bryan's opposition to Lyon's new trial motion,
but was not decided by the trial court. (R. 425-427).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES, AND RULES
A post-verdict motion for a new trial is governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (copied in
Appendix 1 of this brief). Rule 59(a)(6) permits a new trial based upon "[insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict...." Utah R. Civ. P. 50 (also in Appendix 1)
addresses motions for directed verdict, and motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by appellant John
Lyon against appellee Donald Bryan, M.D. The lawsuit proceeded to a jury trial in the
Second Judicial District Court, Ogden Department, the Honorable Michael A. Lyon,
presiding. The trial jury found, by a 6-2 vote, that appellee Dr. Bryan had been negligent.
However, the jury unanimously found that such negligence had not caused harm to
appellant Lyon. (R. 537, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.)
Appellant Lyon moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient
to support the jury's unanimous finding of "no causation." (R. 383-385.) After briefing
and oral argument (R. 386-406, 414-479, 516-529, 627), the trial court entered its Ruling
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial. (R. 537-542, in Br. of Appellant Addendum
C.) This appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Preface
A jury found that Dr. Bryan had committed negligence, but also found that such
negligence had not caused the harm suffered by Lyon. The trial court reviewed the case,
and denied appellant Lyon's motion for a new trial. To properly assess whether the trial
court's decision was reasonable, Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 938, this Court needs to not
merely assess evidence supporting the trial court's decision, but also must acknowledge
the evidentiary conflicts and ambiguities. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah
1993) (conflicting evidence recited "to the extent necessary to understand the issues on
appeal"). This fact recitation is drafted accordingly.
Overview
This case is based upon an allegation of failure to diagnose a post-surgical
complication. On November 15, 2005, Dr. Bryan performed elective left shoulder
(rotator cuff) surgery on appellant Lyon, to repair damage of several years' duration. (R.
106-108.) The parties agreed that the surgery was competently performed. (R. 625 p. 16,
testimony of Lyon's orthopedist expert, Dr. Serfustini; R. 626 p. 88, closing argument of
Lyon's counsel.)
Post-surgery, appellant Lyon developed deep vein thrombosis (DVT) — i.e., one or
more blood clots — in his left arm. (R. 625 p. 162.) The parties agreed that the DVT was

J

Dr. Bryan also performed carpal tunnel surgery on both of appellant Lyon's wrists. (R.
2.) Lyon made no malpractice claim related to those surgeries.
4

not caused by negligence. (R. 625 pp. 57, 59-60, testimony of Lyon's orthopedist expert,
Dr. Serfustini; R. 626 p. 89-90, closing argument of Lyon's counsel.) Instead, Lyon
alleged that Dr. Bryan negligently failed to diagnose and promptly treat the DVT, during
a follow-up examination thirteen days post-surgery, on November 28,2005. (R. 336.) As
a result, alleged Lyon, one or more of the clots migrated from his arm into his lungs,
causing a pulmonary embolism that was diagnosed four days later, and that required a
three-day hospitalization. (R. 3; R. 624 p. 133.)
Trial of appellant Lyon's malpractice lawsuit took four days. Lyon, a retired
railroad worker, did not seek recovery for medical expenses, lost wages, or other
economic damages. He sought only general "pain and suffering" damages. (R. 369; R.
626 p. 89, closing argument of Lyon's counsel.)
Evidence re: Negligence
At trial, the evidence was in dispute about the signs and symptoms that were
presented by appellant Lyon, to Dr. Bryan, during the November 28, 2005 follow-up
examination. Lyon testified that he was showing signs and symptoms of DVT at that time
- including extreme pain and unusual swelling in the arm, and that he reported this to Dr.
Bryan. (R. 624 p. 119-124.) Appellee Dr. Bryan testified to the contrary - in effect, that
Lyon's presentation on November 28 indicated an uneventful recovery, with no more pain
and swelling than would normally be expected. (R. 625 pp. 137-140, 150-158, 165, 172173, 180.) Lyon and Dr. Bryan each presented other evidence to support their respective

5

positions on this factual dispute; that evidence will be described, in more detail, in
argument point I-C of this brief.
The foregoing factual dispute was central to the question whether Dr. Bryan had
negligently failed to diagnose the DVT. If evidence supporting appellant Lyon was
believed, it was more likely that Dr. Bryan had negligently overlooked the DVT. If
evidence supporting Dr. Bryan was believed, no DVT warning signs and symptoms were
present during the November 28 examination, and therefore, the DVT was not negligently
overlooked. (R. 625 p. 47; R. 626 p. 40-41, testimony of defense orthopedist
Vanderhooft; R. 626 p. 88-89, closing argument of Lyon's counsel.)
Evidence re: Causation
To establish causation - i.e., that failure to diagnose the DVT had caused the
pulmonary embolism - appellant Lyon relied upon the testimony of his orthopedist
expert, Dr. Serfustini. Regarding causation, Serfustini initially testified as follows:
[Appellant Lyon's counsel]: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
Mr. Lyon's subsequent pulmonary embolism was more likely than not
caused by the lack of him getting attention on November 28?
[Dr. Serfustini]: Counsel that's really, not only is that the answer is a
medical one, the answer is a common sense one. If you define the problem
that is a blood clot you take timely action then you stand an excellent
chance of preventing this blood clot from breaking loose and going to his
lungs.
(R. 625 p. 39, in Br. of Appellant Addendum B.) Appellant Lyon's counsel attempted to
clarify that response, as follows:
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[Counsel]: Alright and just to make sure we're clear on this so would you,
taking in account all your years of experience and training think that Mr.
Lyon's blood clot, blood clot to his lungs, pulmonary embolism, was more
likely than not a result of him not being treated on 11/28?
[Serfustini]: Correct
(R. 625 p. 38-39.)
Dr. Serfustini briefly repeated the above-quoted opinion, upon cross and redirect
examination. (R. 625 pp. 60-61, 89.) In its ruling denying appellant Lyon's new trial
motion, the trial court found that opinion to be "uncontroverted." (R. 539, in Br. of
Appellant Addendum C.)
No Plaintiff Motion for Directed Verdict
At the close of appellant Lyon's case in chief, appellee Dr. Bryan moved for a
directed verdict. The trial court denied that motion, finding that appellant Lyon had
introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to consider whether the "negligence" and
"causation" elements of Lyon's claim were proven. (R. 625 p. 98-101.)
At the close of appellee Bryan's case in chief, appellant Lyon did not move for
directed verdict, on any element of his case. Instead, jury instructions were read, and
closing arguments presented. (R. 625 p. 84-87.)
Closing Argument
During closing argument, Lyon's counsel cited Serfustini's "causation" testimony
briefly. He argued that there was no dispute on the "causation" element of his claim. (R.
626 pp. 91, 106, 109; closing arguments are fully copied in Appendix 2 of this brief.)
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The bulk of both parties' closing argument was devoted to the central factual
dispute about whether signs and symptoms of DVT had been present during the
November 28, 2005 follow-up examination. Resolution of that dispute would determine
whether Dr. Bryan had negligently failed to diagnose the DVT. Lyon, through counsel,
naturally argued that Lyon's version of the follow-up examination was credible, and that
Dr. Bryan's version was not. (R. 626, closing arguments, in Appendix 2.)
However, one prominent feature of appellant Lyon's closing argument really
addressed neither "negligent failure to diagnose" nor "causation." During presentation of
evidence, Lyon's counsel had elicited an admission, from Dr. Bryan, that he had put
inaccurate "informed consent" notes in Lyon's care record. Specifically, those notes
recited that certain risks, including risks of DVT, had been explained to Lyon. Dr. Bryan
admitted he did not actually inform Lyon of the DVT risk. He further admitted that those
"informed consent" notes consisted of "generic," computer-stored language that he placed
in the records of all his surgical patients. (R. 625 pp. 127-128, 158-163, 177-178.)
During closing argument, appellant Lyon's counsel emphasized those inaccurate
"informed consent" notes. He had them blown up into poster-sized, demonstrative
argument exhibits. (R. 540; those demonstrative exhibits would later be described as
"refrigerator-sized," R. 627 pp. 22, 31.) Counsel pronounced himself "shocked" and
"stunned" that Dr. Bryan would create such "phony" clinical notes. (R. 626 pp. 94, 138139, in Appendix 2.)
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The Verdict
After closing arguments, the jury deliberated, guided by the agreed-upon jury
instructions. (R. 626 p. 86-87.) Following over four hours of deliberation (R. 314), the
jury returned a Special Verdict Form that asked, first: "Considering all the evidence in
this case, was Defendant Donald Bryan, M.D., negligent?" To that question, the jury
answered, "Yes." (Special Verdict Form, R. 334, Br. of Appellant Addendum tab A.)
Post-verdict polling revealed that answer to be a 6-2 split decision. (R. 626 p. 150-151.)
The second Special Verdict question was, "If your answer to Question 1 is 4yes,'
was such negligence the proximate cause of any injury or damage to the Plaintiff?" To
this question, the jury answered, "No." (Special Verdict Form, R. 334-335, in Br. of
Appellant Addendum A.) This answer was unanimous. (R. 626 p. 151-154.)
Motion for New Trial
Moving for a new trial, appellant Lyon argued that the only permissible answer to
the Special Verdict "causation" question was "Yes." (R. 483-489, 516-522.) The trial
court denied the new trial motion, explaining two principal grounds:
First, the trial court found that Lyon's "causation" testimony, from Dr. Serfustini,
which "spanned approximately one minute of one witness's lengthy testimony as part of a
four-day trial," "was not presented in an emphatic, or even a very clear, manner." (R.
539, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) Noting the jury's prerogative to reject expert
testimony, the trial court found that "the jury was well within its bounds to disregard Dr.
Serfustini's opinion, if it saw fit to do so." (R. 540, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.)
9

Second, the trial court agreed "that, as a result of the emphasis placed on
Defendant's inaccurate [informed consent] notes, the jury may have found Defendant
negligent in his note-taking, and not for his failure to diagnose the blood clots in
Plaintiffs arm." "Such a scenario," the court held, "would explain the jury's unanimous
finding of no cause of action, given that Defendant's inaccurate note-taking may have
been negligent, but could not have caused Plaintiffs pulmonary embolism." (R. 540-541,
in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.)
The trial court then seemingly equivocated on the second ground, yet summed up
as follows: "While the Court cannot state with certainty what led the jury to answer %yes'
as to negligence and 'no' as to causation, the Court is satisfied that there are multiple
reasonable ways in which the jury could have come to such a conclusion." Finding the
verdict "not 'so contrary to the manifest weight' of the evidence," the trial court denied
Lyon's motion for a new trial. (R. 541, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) On appeal,
Lyon urges reversal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of appellant Lyon's new trial
motion under the highly deferential "reasonableness" review standard. That standard
both permits and expects that in deciding a new trial motion, the trial court will, utilizing
its advantaged perspective to view the entirety of the trial, consider the weight of the
evidence, the presentation of evidence and argument, and the likely influences of
10

evidence and argument upon the jury deliberations. The trial court also must grant a
strong presumption of correctness to the jury's verdict
Under these standards, the trial court's denial of Lyon's new trial motion should be
affirmed under either or both of two grounds: One, Lyon's evidence on "causation,"
upon which he bore the burden of proof, was reasonably assessed, by the trial court, as
evidence that was not so compelling that the jury was bound to accept it. Two, the trial
court reasonably held that Lyon's misplaced emphasis upon Dr. Bryan's "phony" clinical
notes could have induced the jury to find that negligence had been committed, but that
such negligence did not cause harm. The trial court's decision is consistent with the
conflicting evidence on negligence, and with the Special Verdict Form that did not limit
the jury's "negligence" deliberations to the "failure to diagnose" allegation.

n
This Court should not review the jury verdict independently, as though no motion
for a new trial were made. Such review would improperly bypass the deference and
respect, due to the trial court, following its careful consideration of Lyon's new trial
motion under the governing standards.
Also, Lyon is procedurally barred from independent review of his "no competent
evidence" argument, because he made no motion for directed verdict. Such motion is
necessary to preserve a "no competent evidence" argument for appeal. Having made no
motion for directed verdict, Lyon consented to have the jury decide the weight and

11

persuasiveness of his "causation" evidence, subject only to post-verdict review under the
standards governing a motion for new trial.
If this Court were to independently review the jury verdict, it should affirm. The
Ortiz case, relied upon by appellant Lyon, is procedurally different from this case, in that
no motion for a new trial was made. It is also substantively different, in that the evidence
supporting the appellant, in Ortiz, was far stronger than the evidence supporting Lyon's
"causation" argument in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of appellant Lyon's motion for a
new trial, under the settled, highly deferential standard of appellate review. In this point,
appellee Dr. Bryan first explains the review standard in more detail, and then applies it to
the circumstances of this case.
A, Standard of Review.
A trial court's denial of a new trial motion, when the motion is based upon alleged
insufficiency of evidence, is reversed only for "abuse of discretion, i.e., no reasonable
basis for the decision." Crookston II 860 P.2d at 938.2 This highly deferential

2

Denial of a new trial motion is reviewed less deferentially if the trial court's decision is
based upon a mistake of law. Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 938. In this case, appellant Lyon
does not argue that the trial court made any mistake of law.
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"reasonableness" standard is based upon the trial court's advantaged position to assess
trial evidence as it is presented - not merely upon the sterile, written record: "The reason
that any determination as to whether the jury exceeded its proper bounds is best made in
the first instance by the trial court is that the trial judge is present during all aspects of the
trial and listens to and views all witnesses." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d
789, 804 (Utah 1991) {Crookston I). See also Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah
1982) (trial court "has heard the testimony and other evidence presented to the jury and is
best suited to evaluate the claim that it is insufficient to justify the verdict"); Holmes v.
Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435,441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (1958) (Crockett, J., concurring)
(appellate courts respect the trial courts' "advantaged position" to assess the evidence on
new trial motions).
Implicit in the foregoing case law is the trial court's prerogative, on a motion for
new trial, to assess not merely the existence, but the persuasiveness, of trial evidence.
The trial court should consider "all aspects of the trial," Crookston I 817 P.2d at 804 including the likely influence of counsel's arguments about that evidence. The overarching "reasonable basis" standard, for appellate review of a new trial motion, clearly
contemplates the trial court's prerogative to review the entirety of the trial, as well as the
trial court's advantaged ability to assess why a jury has decided a given case in a given
manner. The trial court is not restricted to dry analysis of a sterile, written record.
Well-settled law also requires a trial court, upon motion for a new trial, to be
deferential toward the jury. (Ruling, R. 537-538, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) A
13

trial court may order a new trial if it finds that the verdict was insufficiently supported by
the evidence. E.g., Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d at 732; King v. Union Paa R. Co., 117
Utah 40, 50, 212 P.2d 692, 697 (1949). However, "the trial court cannot grant a new trial
on the basis of insufficient evidence unless the record contains 'substantial competent
evidence which would support a verdict for the [moving party].'" Nelson v. Trujillo, 657
P.2d at 732 (quoting King) (brackets in original, emphasis added).
A new trial cannot be granted merely because the trial judge disagrees with the
jury's verdict. Crookston /, 817 P.2d at 799 n.9. Instead, the verdict must be
"manifestly" or "clearly" contrary to the evidence. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown
and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986). A new trial should not be granted
unless "the jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight that the trial judge cannot
in good conscience permit it to stand." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah
1984) (quoting authority, internal quotations omitted). It must "clearly appear" that the
jury has refused to accept credible, uncontradicted evidence, with no rational basis for
rejecting it. Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 379-380, 412 P.2d 615,
617 (1966). A new trial motion, on grounds of insufficient evidence, should be granted
"with reluctance." Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 282, 351 P.2d 952,
955 (1960). When a jury has "conscientiously and without any showing of prejudice or
other extraneous influences decided the matter, there must be some basic and compelling
reason" to justify a new trial. Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 122 Utah 298,
305, 249 P.2d 826, 829(1952).
14

To this Court, appellant Lyon cites two different Utah cases that, he says, purport
to either command, or prohibit, a trial court from re-weighing the evidence when
presented with a new trial motion that argues "insufficient evidence." Compare Brown v.
Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 288, 391, 472 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1970) (trial court has "personal
duty" to "weigh and consider the evidence") (Br. of Appellant p. 26-27) with Chatelain v.
Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (1940) (cited by Lyon for proposition that "[t]he
trial court should not step into the jury's shoes and attempt to reweigh the evidence") (Br.
of Appellant p. 30). Such cases actually show that a trial court, upon such motion, may
properly indirectly re-weigh the evidence. That is, the trial court determines, from its
advantaged perspective, whether the jury has weighed the evidence in a manner that is
justified, or understandable, under all the circumstances. This approach is consistent with
contemporary Utah case law, cited earlier, commanding trial court deference to jury
decisions. It is also consistent with each party's constitutional right to a jury trial.
However articulated, the review standard is highly deferential. Taking a cue from
the trial court's standards, even if this Court disagrees with the trial court's decision, such
disagreement forms no ground for reversal. The trial court's decision should be affirmed
so long as it is reasonable.4

3

Actually, in Chatelain and Brown, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed trial court decisions
to grant new trial motions, under the "abuse of discretion" review standard. Chatelain,
100 P.2d at 198; Brown, 24 Utah 2d at 391, 472 P.2d at 944 ("large discretion" granted to
trial court). In this case, had the trial court granted Lyon's new trial motion, Dr. Bryan
would be facing an "abuse of discretion" review.
4
Case law governing appellate review of new trial motions is massive and at times
15

B. Reasonable Basis to Find "Causation" Evidence Unpersuasive.
In this case, the trial court's decision was reasonable, first, because it legitimately
determined that the jury could have found appellant Lyon's evidence of "causation" to be
unpersuasive. (R. 539, in Br. of Appellant Addendum tab C.) Again, that evidence
consisted of the testimony of Lyon's orthopedist expert, Dr. Serfustini, repeated as
follows, who could not plainly answer the simple, "yes or no" question posed to him
about this crucial element of Lyon's claim:
[Lyon's Counsel]: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Lyon's
subsequent pulmonary embolism was more likely than not caused by the
lack of him getting attention on November 28?
[Dr. Serfustini]: Counsel that's really, not only is that the answer is a
medical one, the answer is a common sense one. If you define the problem
that is a blood clot you take timely action then you stand an excellent
chance of preventing this blood clot from breaking loose and going to his
lungs.
(Trial transcript, R. 625 p. 39, in Br. of Appellant Addendum B.) Counsel's effort to
clarify and strengthen that response really did not improve things:

contradictory, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Crookston /, 817 P.2d at 799-806. But
appellant Lyon's reliance upon Berven v. Gardner, 414 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1969) (Br. of
Appellant p. 34) is way off-target. Berven was a summary judgment case (although it
purported to involve "findings" of fact), in the administrative law context of deciding
eligibility for federal disability benefits, without a jury. As such, the decision under
review, in Berven, would have been subject to less deferential review even under Utah
law. E.g., State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987) (less deference to bench
verdict than to jury verdict); Salt Lake County v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT App 112
^f 9, 208 P.3d 1087, 1089 (degree of appellate deference varies depending upon amount of
discretion vested in administrative agency). Berven and similar cases provide no support
for the de novo review that Lyon implicitly seeks in this case.
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[Counsel]: Alright and just to make sure we're clear on this so would you,
taking in account all your years of experience and training think that Mr.
Lyon's blood clot, blood clot to his lungs, pulmonary embolism, was more
likely than not a result of him not being treated on 11/28?
[Serfustini]: Correct.
(Id.) Dr. Serfustini further undercut his credibility by disparaging his own "bone
doctor's" understanding of pulmonary emboli:
[Lyon's counsel]: How can you - could you tell us just how that happens?
What actually happens, how something in the arms ends up in the lung.
[Serfustini]: I can tell you what I learned as a medical student and as an
intern - I'm an orthopedic surgeon now, that it interferes with your ability
to transfer oxygen and if you can't transfer oxygen and your oxygen
saturation goes down, you can get some problems with your brain. That's
the orthopedic explanation. I'm sure Dr. Schmitz['s] explanation and the
pulmonologist's explanation is much more sophisticated than a bone
doctor's explanation.5
(R. 625 p. 40.) In denying appellant Lyon's motion for a new trial, the trial court assessed
the foregoing "causation" testimony as follows:
While at first glance the jury's verdict may seem unusual, it is by no
means unreasonable. Despite the burden of proof resting with Plaintiff the
evidence Plaintiff presented on causation was very brief. The entirety of
Plaintiffs evidence spanned approximately one minute of one witness's
lengthy testimony as part of a four-day trial. Considering the minimal
evidence presented on causation, the jury may have concluded that Plaintiff
failed to carry his burden on this point.
Moreover, the evidence on causation was not presented in an
emphatic, or even a very clear, manner. Dr. Serfustini, while agreeing that
failure to diagnose the blood clot led to the pulmonary embolism, gave his
opinion in a way that could have been seen by jurors as equivocal. Instead
of answering "yes" to Plaintiffs counsel's first question of whether he had
5

Dr. Schmitz was the physician who diagnosed the pulmonary embolism on December 2,
2005. (R. 624 p. 6-15.)
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an opinion and then answering directly, clearly, and unequivocally on the
follow-up question, he does neither. Only when Plaintiffs counsel
rephrased the question, "to make sure we're clear," does he really answer
the question clearly. Dr. Serfustini's answers to Plaintiffs counsel's
questions on the issue of causation leave much to be desired, especially for
such a critical element of Plaintiff s case. It is entirely possible, and
reasonable, that the jury may have simply found Dr. Serfustini's testimony
not credible or at least unpersuasive.
(Ruling, R. 539, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C, emphasis added.)
Uncontroverted Evidence Can be Disbelieved
On appeal, Lyon really does not challenge the reasonableness of the trial court's
assessment. Instead, he emphasizes the trial court's finding that Dr. Serfustini's
testimony was uncontroverted. (Br. of Appellant p. 27.) However, a fact finder may
properly reject uncontroverted testimony. In Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), cert denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994), this Court rejected an argument that
was virtually identical to that of appellant Lyon: "Sandy Hills claims that the trial court
should not have disregarded the Smiths' uncontroverted testimony. Clearly, the factfinder is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and is free to disbelieve
their testimony." 866 P.2d at 627.
The trial court, in Homer, rejected uncontroverted testimony that it found to be
"self-serving and not credible," id. at 627 n.8, and this Court affirmed. See also Glauser
Storage, LLC

v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141 \ 24, 27 P.3d 565, 570-571 (affirming trial

court's rejection of uncontroverted testimony). In this case, the trial court observed that
Dr. Serfustini's "causation" testimony was minimal, non-emphatic, and unclear; it left
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"much to be desired." (R. 539, quoted above.) The testimony itself (also quoted above)
supports that observation. Additionally, the trial court and the jury were in the
advantaged position to actually observe Serfustini while giving that testimony. Taking
these factors into account, the trial court properly exercised its discretion, and reasonably
denied appellant Lyon's new trial motion.
Appellant had Burden of Proof
Additionally, as the trial court observed, appellant Lyon bore the burden of proof
for each element of his case, including causation. (R. 539, quoted above; Jury Instructions
12, 25, at R. 359, 365, copied in Appendix 3 of this brief.) That was an affirmative
burden. Dr. Bryan bore no burden to prove the negative - i.e., that any alleged negligence
did not cause harm.
The allocation of the proof burden is significant. Appellate courts in Missouri will
not review claims of evidentiary insufficiency at all where the aggrieved party had the
burden of proof, and was unsuccessful in a motion for new trial:
The verdict in this case rests upon a finding by the jury against the party
having a burden of proof. Consequently, the [appellants'] contention that
the verdict was unsupported by substantial evidence or by any evidence
presents nothing for appellate review. Where a motion for new trial argues
that the juryfs verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the party
seeking a new trial had the burden of proof the circuit couifs denial of the
motion for new trial is a conclusive determination that cannot be overturned
on appeal.
Black and Veatch Corp. v. Wellington Syndicate, 302 S.W.3d 114, 129 (Mo. Ct. App.
W.D. 2009) (emphasis added; internal citations and quotations omitted).

19

This Court need not adopt Missouri's "no appellate review" approach to decide
this case. But it is important to acknowledge that given the proof burden, the verdict in
this case is properly understood as a finding of "not proven" on the "causation" element
of Lyon's claim. It did not matter whether appellee Dr. Bryan introduced any evidence on
that element (Br. of Appellant p. 26), because he had no obligation to do so. The trial
court understood this, which also supports the reasonableness of its decision to uphold the
jury's verdict against Lyon's claim of "insufficient evidence."
Jury Instructions Were Followed
Such understanding is consistent with the jury instructions, as also observed by the
trial court. Instruction No. 15, explaining expert opinion, stated in part: "You are not
bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it deserves." (R. 355, in
Appendix 3.) Instruction No. 3 stated, in part: "You are to determine what witnesses to
believe and what parts of their testimony you believe." This instruction concluded, "the
value of a witness' testimony is for you to determine." (R. 342, in Appendix 3.) Also,
Instruction No. 18 stated, in part:
The preponderance of the evidence is not determined by the number of
witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the convincing character
of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. If the
evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force, you must find that
such allegation has not been proved.
(R. 358, in Appendix 3, emphasis added; the word "quality" may have been substituted
for "character.")
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On appeal, appellant Lyon places a novel construction upon the last sentence of
jury Instruction No. 15, explaining expert opinion:
If you should decide that the opinions of an expert are not based on
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions
are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.
(R. 355, in Appendix 3.) Lyon argues that this sentence restricts the jury's prerogative to
reject expert opinion, permitting it to do so only when the expert's qualifications are
inadequate, the expert's reasoning is unsound, or the expert's opinion is outweighed by
other evidence. (Br. of Appellant p. 33.)
Neither precedent nor logic supports such restriction in the expert opinion
instruction. To hold that such restriction exists would eliminate the jury's prerogative to
reject any testimony that it finds to be unpersuasive. That prerogative was conveyed to
the jury in Instructions 3 and 18, quoted earlier, as well as in Instruction 12 (R. 352, in
Appendix 3, listing factors to assess credibility and weight of evidence). Additionally,
the jury was instructed to "not single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but [to]
consider the instructions as a whole." (Instruction 7, R. 347, in Appendix 3.) It would be
improper to do as appellant Lyon now urges, and elevate the "expert opinion" instruction
above all the others.
Therefore, the trial court correctly characterized the expert testimony factors, in
Instruction No. 15, as "non-exclusive." (R. 540, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) The
jury's "no causation" verdict was in accord with all of its instructions - to which neither
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party objected. Recognizing as much, the trial court reasonably denied appellant Lyon's
motion for a new trial.
"Speculation "
Appellant Lyon also assails the trial court for "a backwards justification of the jury
verdict," or for "speculating" about the reasons for the jury's "no causation" verdict. (Br.
of Appellant pp. 28, 30.) But settled legal standards, set forth earlier, conferred a strong
presumption of validity upon the verdict, which could be rebutted only for "compelling
reasons." Lund v. Phillips Petroleum, 10 Utah 2d at 282, 351 P.2d at 955. The trial court
honored that presumption; it is hard to discern how it could do so any way other than
"backwards," or after-the-fact.6
As for "speculation," as previously explained, the trial court had an advantage,
unavailable to this Court, of actually observing the testimony and evidence as it was
presented, as well as the parties' arguments. Without post-verdict interrogation of all
jurors, which would violate the sanctity of their deliberations, some degree of
"speculation" is inherent in a trial court's decision on a motion for new trial. The trial
court's "speculation," in this case, was based upon its assessment that appellant Lyon's
"causation" evidence was not so compelling as to justify overturning the jury's verdict.
The "reasonableness" standard of review contemplates, rather clearly, that such

6

As will be explained in Point II-B, appellant Lyon could have obtained a "before the
fact" ruling, on the "causation" element of his claim, had he moved for a directed verdict.
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assessment is within the trial court's prerogative - indeed, is expected - when deciding a
motion for a new trial.
In this case, the record on appeal contains nothing to suggest that the trial court's
denial of the new trial motion, based upon its advantaged perspective, based upon the
burden of proof, and based upon proper deference toward the jury's verdict, was an abuse
of discretion. The trial court's decision was reasonable. For this reason, alone, this Court
should affirm the trial court's denial of appellant Lyon's motion for a new trial.
C. Mis-direction by Appellant Caused Off-Target "Negligence" Verdict.
As an additional or alternative ground to affirm, this Court should uphold the trial
court's judgment that appellant Lyon's focus upon Dr. Bryan's inaccurate "informed
consent" notes may have caused the jury to find him negligent in his note-making, but not
in failing to diagnose the DVT. (R. 540, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) The trial
court then "hedged" on this question, stating that it found "nothing that suggests that the
jury abandoned the principal issue of the case, namely, Defendant's failure to diagnose
the blood clots in Plaintiffs arm." (R. 541.) Despite the trial court's apparent
ambivalence, this Court should affirm.
Conflicting Evidence on Negligence
This argument requires a look at the hotly contested evidence as to whether, during
the November 28, 2005 follow-up examination, appellant Lyon was showing such clear
signs and symptoms of DVT that failure to diagnose it was negligent. As set forth in the
fact recitation of this brief, on this question appellant Lyon and Dr. Bryan gave opposing
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testimony. The jury could have found either party more credible.
The testimony of other witnesses provided no clear basis to resolve that credibility
question. Lyon's wife testified similarly to her husband, but admitted that her trial
testimony contained significant detail, about the degree of pain and swelling reported by
Lyon on November 28, that had been absent from her pretrial deposition testimony. (R.
624 p. 211-219). Dr. Bryan's certified nursing assistant testified that she recalled no
report of unusual pain or swelling, by Lyon, on November 28. (R. 625 pp 193, 201-207.)
Physician witnesses also disagreed on this question. Lyon's orthopedist expert, Dr.
Serfustini, interpreting a December 2 clinical description of "brawny edema," opined that
unusual pain and swelling, indicative of DVT, must have been present on November 28.
(R. 625 p. 28-30.) Dr. Bryan disagreed, testifying that the "brawny edema" description
was misleading or inaccurate, and that a DVT clot "can develop and go to the lung in a
matter of hours." (R. 625 p. 143-146.) There was testimony that on December 2, when
the embolism was diagnosed, Lyon reported that he had been experiencing unusual pain
and swelling to his arm for only three days prior - i.e., possibly not beginning until after
the November 28 examination. (R. 624 pp. 53-55, 61-62).
Dr. Bryan's orthopedist expert, Dr. Vanderhooft, opined that because the swelling
that was observed on December 2 did not appear to extend into Lyon's hand, any
increased swelling at that time was recent, and not necessarily suggestive of DVT. (R.
626 pp. 48-50, 76-77, 81-82.) Vanderhooft also opined that because of the extreme rarity
of upper extremity DVT, and because no signs of DVT were noted in Dr. Bryan's care
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records, it would not violate care standards to overlook it. (R. 626 p. 63.) While Lyon's
expert, Serfizstini, disagreed as to whether rarity would excuse a failure to diagnose, he
did acknowledge that DVT is extremely rare in an arm, and that DVT can be difficult to
-i

diagnose. (R. 625 pp. 54-58, 90-94.) There was, in short, substantial evidence upon
which the jury could have found for either party on whether the DVT had been
negligently overlooked, by Dr. Bryan, on November 28.
Non-Specific Instructions on Negligence
Appellant Lyon asserts that the jury found in his favor on this dispute. (Br. of
Appellant pp. 21, 34.) That assertion is unsupported, because of the above-described
conflicting evidence, and because the Special Verdict Form failed to specify that the
negligence in question was failure to diagnose the DVT. It merely asked a non-specific
question: "was the defendant, Donald Bryan, M.D., negligent?" (R. 334-335, in Br. of
Appellant Addendum A.) The trial court noted the non-specificity of that question, in its
ruling denying Lyon's new trial motion. (R. 541, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.)
True, the jury was told that the alleged negligence was failure to diagnose the
DVT. However, that information was conveyed only once, in the trial court's unnumbered introduction to the case, given before presentation of evidence. (All jury
instructions, including the un-numbered introduction, R. 336, are copied in Appendix 3 of

The defense expert, Vanderhooft, also opined that "lumps" on the arm, reportedly
described by Lyon, would not likely be signs of DVT. (R. 626 pp. 43, 83.)
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this brief.) In subsequent instructions, the jury received a "generic" definition of
"negligence," without specification as to the nature of the negligence that Lyon actually
alleged. (Instructions 20, 21, R. 360-361, in Appendix 3.) Appellant Lyon agreed to
those non-specific instructions. (R. 626 p. 86-87.) The trial jury was thereby invited to
find whether Dr. Bryan had committed any type of negligence, without reference to the
"missed diagnosis" allegation.
That non-specificity creates a problem for Lyon, because the jury's divided verdict
on unspecified negligence was not inconsistent with its unanimous "no causation"
finding. In Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981), a jury found
that a urinary catheterization had been negligently performed, but then found that such
negligence did not cause the harm (urinary difficulty) that was alleged by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence did not support the "no
causation" verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the supreme court affirmed, in
light of defense testimony supporting the "no causation" verdict. 635 P.2d at 101.
However, the supreme court also observed as follows regarding the negligence finding:
"Here, not only could the jury have found that the urinary difficulties were not caused by
the catheterization, but it is not clear that the catheterization, rather than some other act
or omission, formed the basis for the finding of negligence'' Id. (emphasis added).

The post-evidence instructions appeair to begin with numbered instruction 7 (R. 347, in
Appendix 3).
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Lyon's problem, in this case, is that it is similarly unclear whether the jury found
that Dr. Byran negligently failed to diagnose the DVT on November 28, or found that he
was negligent in his creation of inaccurate "informed consent" notes. On the former
question, as just explained, the evidence supported a verdict either way. The jury was not
sufficiently instructed to confine its "negligence" deliberations to the former question.
Misplaced Emphasis on "Phony" Clinical Notes
Appellant Lyon compounded that problem, by stressing Dr. Bryan's creation of the
"phony" clinical notes. (R. 626 pp. 94-95, 138-139.) Dr. Bryan acknowledged that those
"informed consent" notes were inaccurate. (R. 626 p. 136-137.) Appellant Lyon's
counsel enlarged those "phony notes" to poster-sized exhibits, and he displayed and
emphasized them during closing argument. (R. 540, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.)
Such emphasis misdirected the jury, by inviting it to consider the "phony notes," by
themselves, to constitute negligence.
Trying to undo his own misdirected closing argument, appellant Lyon now argues,
in effect, that the trial jury should have ignored it. (Br. of Appellant p. 35, emphasizing
instruction that "statements of the lawyers were not evidence.") Such argument ignores
reality. Closing argument is intended to persuade. Because of this, a significant body of
case law has developed about improper closing arguments. A chief concern is that
misleading or improper closing argument can, and at times does, induce juries to
disregard or overlook the law, as embodied in their instructions. See, e.g., State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 \ 55-61, 979 P.2d 799, 818-819 (reviewing multiple allegations of
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improper argument for impropriety and likelihood of prejudice). "When the evidence in
the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced
by improper argument." State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349 \ 35, 173 P.3d 170, 178-179.
In this case, with conflicting evidence on negligence, Lyon's own argument likely
influenced the jury's divided finding that negligence had been committed.
Lyon also tries to rehabilitate, or re-focus, his emphasis upon Dr. Lyon's "phony
notes." The thrust of such emphasis, he asserts, was "that Dr. Bryan's notes demonstrated
the doctor's lack of credibility." (Br. of Appellant p. 35.) That assertion is not supported
by the record. The argument portions cited by Lyon were as follows:
We have now heard from Dr. Bryan that [the "informed consent" notes are]
identical because they're phony. He just tells his assistant to push a key on
every patient's file and put this identical record in every patient's file. Yet
they want us to rely upon the notes of Dr. Bryan because they don't say
anything about a swollen arm on 11/28.
(R. 626 p. 94-95, in Appendix 2 of this brief.)
. . . John Lyon some six months later, May of 2006 went in to get a copy of
all of Dr. Bryan's notes. This is six months later and walks in and the
assistant there . . . says, Oh, you're in luck, we just finished getting those
into the computer. This is months from the time that Mr. Lyon had seen Dr.
Bryan and it is, I think it's months even from the time he very last saw Dr.
Bryan. You heard Dr. Bryan say I don't take hand notes. I just go and
dictate them. If he's preparing these notes after, he's preparing them in
May or even April, this is after he knows that John Lyon has been in the
hospital with a pulmonary embolism.
(R. 626 p. 104-105, in Appendix 2.) Neither the above-quoted portions, nor any other
portion of Lyon's closing argument (fully copied in Appendix 2), clearly conveys the idea
that the inaccuracy of Dr. Bryan's "informed consent" notes impeaches the credibility of
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his other clinical notes — or of his trial testimony. Such argument simply was not
articulated, to the trial jury, in any understandable fashion.
Reasonable Trial Court Assessment, and Invited Error
Given the conflicting evidence on negligence, the insufficiently specific
instructions and verdict form on negligence, and Lyon's emphasis upon Dr. Bryan's
"phony" clinical notes, it is not at all surprising that the jury made a divided, 6-2 finding
on negligence. The majority jurors, insufficiently instructed, could have found the
"phony" notes to be negligent, while the minority jurors could have found the "phony"
notes to be irrelevant. All jurors could have agreed that the DVT was not negligently
overlooked, and all jurors could have agreed that the "phony notes" did not cause the
pulmonary embolism. This would explain, as the trial court observed, the unanimous "no
causation" decision. (R. 540-541, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.)9
Given the foregoing problems, the trial court reasonably held that "as a result of
the emphasis placed on [Dr. Bryan]'s inaccurate notes, the jury may have found [Dr.
Bryan] negligent in his note-taking, and not for his failure to diagnose the blood clots in
[Lyon]'s arm." (R. 540, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) Significantly, those problems
9

Besides inducing likely confusion as to the nature of the negligence in issue, appellant
Lyon's focus upon the "informed consent" notes probably obscured the question of
causation. The trial transcript contains 45 pages of closing argument by Lyon's counsel
(R. 626 pp. 87-111, 138-147, in Appendix 2.) Of those 45 pages, only about 21 lines
address causation, in relatively offhand fashion. (R. 626 p. 91 lines 6-11, p. 106 lines 5-8,
14-16, p. 109 lines 12-16, in Appendix 2.) Some 30 lines of argument, plus the postersized enlargements, were devoted to the "phony" notes on "informed consent." (R. 626 p„
94 lines 7-25, p. 95 lines 1-8, p. 138 line 25 to 139 lines 1-2, in Appendix 2.)
29

were created by appellant Lyon, who approved the nonspecific jury instructions and
verdict form on negligence (R. 626 p. 86-87), and who fervently assailed the "phony
notes." In effect, Lyon thereby invited the jury to commit the error that he now alleges.
"[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the
trial court into committing the error." State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 ^ 9, 86 P.3d
742, 744. The reasonableness of the trial court's decision is further supported by this
"invited error" principle.
* * #

In sum, under the deferential, "reasonableness" standard for review of new trial
motions, this Court should affirm the trial court's judgment. Affirmance may be based
upon the trial court's assessment that Lyon's "causation" evidence was legitimately found
non-persuasive, or upon the trial court's assessment of Lyon's "phony notes" emphasis,
or upon both of these grounds. Both were properly within the trial court's purview,
during its careful consideration of Lyon's new trial motion.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS ADJUDICATED
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF EVIDENTIARY INSUFFICIENCY
VIA THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, THIS COURT
SHOULD NOT INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THAT CLAIM
In his first point on appeal, appellant Lyon implicitly asks this Court to review his
argument of "evidentiary insufficiency" independently - as if he had never requested, and
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the trial court had never denied, a new trial As follows, this Court should review only
the denial of Lyon's new trial motion, and affirm, for the reasons stated in Point I of this
brief. But if it does review the evidence independently, this Court should affirm.
A. Deference and Respect for Trial Court
Appellate review of a jury verdict, when no motion for new trial has been
interposed, is deferential. The evidence is reviewed "in the light most favorable to that
verdict." E.g., Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32 <fl 2, 48
P.3d 888, 890 (quoting authority). For the reasons explained in Point I-A, when a new
trial motion has been made, and has been decided by the trial court, appellate courts grant
extra deference. In fact, there appears to be no Utah case wherein the appellate court,
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, did so both independently and in the context of a
new trial ruling. In this case, that is what Lyon asks this Court to do. He wants to avoid
the extra deference that is owed to the trial court's denial of his new trial motion.
It would be improper to independently review the sufficiency of the evidence, as
though no motion for a new trial had ever been interposed. Besides bypassing the trial
court's discretion, such review would be disrespectful of the trial court's conscientious
effort, in this case, to carefully consider all of the evidence, as well as the parties'
arguments, related to the new trial motion. Cf. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange 860 P.2d
937, 940 (Utah 1993) {Crookston II) (approving the trial court's "very detailed" decision
on new trial motion). The trial court did not rubber-stamp the jury's decision; rather, it
carefully and thoughtfully considered the parties' arguments on the new trial motion.
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Therefore, this Court should deny Lyon's request for independent review of the evidence;
it should only review the trial court's decision on the new trial motion.
B. Procedural Bar.
Additionally, this Court should deny independent review of appellant Lyon's
"evidentiary insufficiency" claim, because he has not preserved an entitlement to such
review. Lyon argues that there was "no substantial competent evidence" upon which a
"reasonable, fair jury" could answer "no" to the question of causation. (Br. of Appellant
p. 18.) He failed to present such argument, to the trial court, before the case was
submitted to the jury.
Such argument could have been presented, in the form of a directed verdict motion
under Utah R. Civ. P. 50 (copied in Appendix 1). Under Rule 50(a), such motion is
available to a plaintiff, just as it is available to a defendant. See, e.g., Judd v. Drezga,
2004 UT 91 f 8, 103 P.3d 135, 138 (trial court took questions of negligence and causation
away from the jury, and decided for plaintiff; jury then decided damages.) If a party's
motion for directed verdict is denied, and an adverse jury verdict is returned, that party
has, by making the directed verdict motion, preserved his or her right to move for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) "in accordance with his motion for a
directed verdict." Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b).
A motion for j.n.o.v. must be granted if there is "no competent evidence" to
support a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693,
695 (Utah 1982). That language is essentially the same as the "uncontroverted evidence"
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or "no substantial evidence" mantra that Lyon repeatedly invokes in his brief to this
Court. It is also the same standard that applies to a motion for summary judgment. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, All U.S.242, 250-251 (1986) (under federal law, summary
judgment and directed verdict standards are equivalent). In this case, appellant Lyon
cannot invoke that standard on appeal, because he did not make his "no substantial
evidence" argument in a directed verdict motion. Hence, the trial court was given no
opportunity to resolve such argument before the jury deliberated.
Such resolution could have taken two forms. Under one scenario, appellant Lyon
could have obtained the directed verdict, on causation, that he now demands on appeal.
The case would then have been submitted to the jury solely on the "negligence" element
of his claim. The parties' closing arguments would have been focused accordingly, and
in all likelihood, the ambiguity in the jury's verdict would have been avoided.
Under a second scenario, appellee Dr. Bryan could have been permitted to reopen the evidence on causation, to impeach Dr. Serfustini's testimony. This is
significant, because Dr. Serfustini, during his pretrial deposition (R. 622), was even more
vague, about causation, than he was during trial. For one thing, he acknowledged that
even if the DVT had been diagnosed during the November 28 examination, the
pulmonary embolism "could have occurred anyway." (R. 622 p. 61, copied in Appendix
4.) For another, Serfustini's deposition testimony was that timely detection of the DVT
would have created a "better chance" of preventing the embolism, rather than the
"excellent chance" that he asserted at trial. (R. 622 p. 59, in Appendix 4; compare trial
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testimony, supra pp. 6-7, 16-17 of this brief, and in Br. of Appellant Addendum B.) It
would have been proper for the trial court, if faced with a timely motion for directed
verdict, to permit the defense to re-open the evidence, and to permit such impeachment,
via Serfustini's prior inconsistent statements on causation.10
There is, in short, a prescribed rule by which an appellant can preserve a "no
competent evidence" argument for independent appellate review. In this case, Lyon has
not invoked that rule. He thereby consented to let the jury decide whether his evidence,
on the "causation" element of his claim, on which he bore the burden of proof, was
sufficiently persuasive. The jury decided that it was not, and the trial court has upheld the
jury's decision. Therefore, Lyon cannot make a "no competent evidence" argument on
appeal. Nor can he otherwise demand appellate review as though his motion for a new
trial had never been made and decided. Instead, appellate review is limited to the trial
court's denial of his new trial motion, under the "reasonableness" standard. Under such
review, as explained in Point I, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
C. Ortiz Decision Does Not Control
Finally, if this Court were to review Lyon's "insufficient evidence" claim
independently, it should affirm. Lyon relies upon Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc.,

10

Appellant Lyon's able counsel doubtlessly recognized, going into trial, that Serfustini's
deposition testimony on causation was weak. He could not elicit significantly stronger
trial testimony from Serfustini without highlighting the inconsistency with his deposition
testimony. Hence, at trial, Serfustini described an "excellent" chance of preventing the
embolism, had treatment begun on November 28 — only marginally stronger than the
"better" chance that he had identified during his deposition.
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939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), wherein this Court reversed a jury's finding of "no
negligence." (Br. of Appellant p. 15-19.) Lyon's reliance upon Ortiz is understandable,
because in that case, this Court reversed a verdict that had been adverse to the party with
the burden of proof. Lyon seeks a similar outcome, in this case, regarding the "no
causation" verdict.
Procedurally, Lyon's reliance upon Ortiz is misplaced, because there is no
indication that the trial court, in Ortiz, was ever presented with a post-verdict motion for a
new trial; rather, judgment was entered on the verdict, and the appeal followed. 939 P.2d
at 1216. Therefore, there was no occasion for this Court, in Ortiz, to pay the extra
deference accorded to a trial court's decision on a new trial motion. It also appears that in
Ortiz, no directed verdict was sought by either party. Nor does the opinion address the
allocation of the proof burden, at trial. Had such issues been raised in Ortiz, perhaps that
appeal would have had a different outcome.
More important, Ortiz is significantly different, substantively, from this case.
While described as a case involving "insufficient evidence," this Court asserted its
prerogative to reverse a jury verdict "upon a showing that the evidence so clearly
preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the
outcome of the case." 939 P.2d at 1216 (citing and quoting authority). The Court first
recited evidence supporting the appellant's position that negligence had been proven:
Three witnesses, the Court held, supported appellant's position. The Court reviewed
those witnesses' testimony in detail. Id. at 1217. Then, the contrary testimony of a single
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opposing witness was marshaled, and deemed legally inadequate to support the "no
negligence" verdict Id. at 1217-1218.
In this case, appellant Lyon can scarcely lay claim to evidence, supporting the
"causation" element of his claim, of nearly the same "clearly preponderating" strength.
He offered one witness on causation, Dr. Serfustini. The text of Serfustini's testimony
(supra pp. 6-7, 16-17 of this brief) reveals it to be neither cogent nor compelling. The
trial court found that it was "not presented in an emphatic, or even a very clear, manner."
(R. 539, in Br. of Appellant Addendum C.) Therefore, even if this Court independently
reviews the jury verdict, without regard to Lyon's new trial motion, it should affirm.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in Point I, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial
of Lyon's new trial motion. For the reasons explained in Point II, this Court should
decline to independently review the sufficiency of the evidence. For all the reasons stated
herein, the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J J day of February, 2011.
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C.

DAVID H. EPPERS($f
J. KEVIN MURPHY (of counsel)
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
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APPENDIX 1

Westlaw,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*1 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
K
M Part V1L Judgment
-* RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion
by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general
or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply
affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the court of its own initiative may order a
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify
the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59

days after entry of the judgment.
Current with amendments effective November 1,2010.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Westlaw
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*ii Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
K
M Part VI Tnals
-* RULE 50. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence m the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made A motion for a directed verdict
which is not granted is not a waiver of tnal by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed
verdicts A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor The order of the court granting a
motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close
of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion Not later than ten days after entry of
judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered m accordance with his motion for a directed verdict, or if a verdict
was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict A motion for a new trial may be jomed with this motion, or a new trial
may be prayed for m the alternative If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed or may order a new trial
(c) Same: conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for m Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted,
the court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for grantmg or denying the motion for a new
trial If the motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the
judgment In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal,
the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered In case the motion for a new trial has
been conditionally demed, the respondent on appeal may assert error m that denial, and if the judgment is reversed
on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be m accordance with the order of the appellate court
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(d) Same: denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new tnal m the event the appellate court
concludes that the trial court erred m denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict If the appellate
court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is entitled to a
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new tnal, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2010.
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson ReutersAVest. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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1

law.

2

exception by them and at this point they are prepared and

3

ready to go and I'm proposing that I instruct you in the law

4

on this case.

5

minutes, maybe less, maybe a little more.

6

pretty close to the noon hour and then I propose that we take

7

a lunch break.

8

hour or a little more.

9

feel a need to take care of some things that are needful and

10

you've been in trial all week or maybe there are things that

11

you need in the home.

12

soon get on with this case.

13

what you would like to do and if you'd like to take just a

14

moment and just visit among yourselves and then let me know

15

how you feel, we'll then begin with instructions.

16

These have been reviewed by them, been passed without

I'm estimating that this may take me about 20
That'll take us

I'd like to know whether you would like an
I know sometimes people who work,

On the other hand, maybe you'd just as
So I'm going to just defer to

(Closing instructions not requested for transcription).

17

(Whereupon a noon recess was taken)

18

THE COURT:

19

The record will show the jury has

returned and we're ready for closing arguments.

20

Mr. Savage, you may begin.

21

MR. SAVAGE:

Thank you.

If it please the Court,

22

Dr. Bryan, Mr. Epperson, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.

23

Well, we've reached that point where we're about done.

24

is where a couple of old sleep deprived lawyers get to stand

25

up m

This

front of you and tell you what they think the evidence
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1

has shown.

2

statement, for you to return a verdict against Mr. Lyon in

3

this case, you have to decide that he and his wife are liars.

4

This case is about what they told Dr. Bryan on November 28th

5

and what Dr. Bryan thinks he remembers about that and what

6

appeared in notes.

7

And as I believe I stated to you in my opening

The sub-issue of this case, of course, is notes

8

versus sworn testimony.

This witness chair is a hot seat.

9

witness sitting there has a white light on them and in my

A

10

many years of experience, I've come to have high regard for

11

the effect of examination and cross

12

witnesses say on the stand.

13

helpful, they can be determinative.

14

are very interesting because Mr. Epperson's case is entirely

15

based upon a review of notes and ignoring everything that Mr.

16

Lyon and Mrs. Lyon says occurred on November 28.

17

examination, what

Notes can be good, notes can be
But in this case, notes

There is no claim in this case that Dr. Bryan did

18

anything wrong with the surgery, the surgery was fine.

It's

19

not an issue in this case whether or not he's a fine surgeon.

20

I think the evidence is he is a fine surgeon.

21

anything to do with whether he's a fine man.

22

case turns upon is whether or not John Lyon presented with a

23

swollen arm, a very swollen arm on 11/28 and Dr. Bryan failed

24

to pay attention to what his patient said, failed to take

25

action with respect to that arm and the damage that that

Doesn't have
No, what this

1

delay in the treatment for the blood clots that we now know

2

formed, cost.

3

So what is the evidence?

What I say isn't

4

evidence, what Mr. Epperson says isn't evidence but we're

5

both going to try to do our best, I think, to remind you and

6

touch upon what we think the evidence has shown.

7

collective recollection is different from mine or Mr.

8

Epperson's, please rely on your own and not anything either

9

one of us says.

10

If your

That being said, what is this case about?

I've got

11

a couple of things it's not about.

12

expenses.

Mr. Lyon is not making any claim for the medical

13

expenses.

I think we've had the testimony that his medical

14

expenses were covered by insurance and insurance company

15

hasn't made any claim to have those reimbursed.

16

claim of lost wages.

17

claim of lost future earning capacity.

18

We're here for the general damages that Mr. Lyon incurred, if

19

you find, and I think you will, that Dr. Bryan was negligent,

20

that one time, that one date and it could have cost that

21

patient his life, causing pain in his chest for five months,

22

he couldn't lay down, couldn't sleep.

23

testify in 40 years of marriage, she's never seen that tough

24

guy in so much pain.

25

It's not about medical

Mr. Lyon was retired.

There is no

There is no

Mr. Lyon is retired.

You heard his wife

It's about whether or not the blood clots - we know
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1

from all of the testimony, the doctors agree, blood clot

2

formed in his arm, probably from the surgery, doesn't matter.

3

We're not making any claim there's anything wrong with the

4

surgery that caused the clot.

5

had the clot from genetics or anything else.

6

as to whether or not he had that clot on November 28 when he

7

saw Dr. Bryan and whether or not Dr. Bryan missed that

8

diagnosis and caused everything that happened since.

It doesn't matter if Mr. Lyon
It ]ust matters

9

You've heard all the doctors, they all agree that

10

the therapy for blood clots, the administration of Heparin.

11

I think we might have used the trade name of the low

12

molecular weight Heparin, Lomonox or Lomonex, I can't

13

remember which and the Coumadin that comes into the system a

14

little slower and so you do the Heparin first with shots.

15

Mr. Lyon's case I think there's some testimony also could be

16

IVs, that immediately stops the body from forming more clots.

17

In

In this case, that therapy didn't start until

18

December 2.

19

days or not having that treatment and during that period of

20

time his blood clots increased, his arm developed more clots,

21

developed so many clots that one of them kicked loose and

22

went to his lung.

23

the truth, it all happened after he saw Dr. Bryan and Dr.

24

Bryan could have diagnosed it, putting on the Heparin - well,

25

sent him to radiology to confirm.

I

Mr. Lyon had, as counsel would like to say, four

That all happened, if Mr. Lyon is telling

We know now that sending
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1

him to radiology on the 2nd did confirm he had the clots in

2

his arm, get him on the Heparin to stop anything further from

3

happening.

4

the 29th, didn't happen on the 30th, didn't happen on the 1st,

5

didn't happen until December 2nd.

6

because of that had the clot got to his lung.

7

testified that it's more likely than not that that wouldn't

8

have happened had Mr. Lyon been put on the Heparin, Coumadin

9

therapy on the 28th.

That didn't happen on the 28th, didn't happen in

Dr. Serfustini

But it did happen because he was not

10

diagnosed.

11

lung pain, shortness of breath.

12

Mr. Lyon now has, now

It did go to his lung and it caused him terrible

We've heard testimony from reading the notes of

13

doctors that Dr. Sophey said his pain wasn't significant when

14

he got to the hospital.

15

significant when he saw him and you heard Mr. Lyon testify

16

that he was in so much pain - this guy that never takes pills

17

- had to stop on the way to the emergency room to take two

18

pain pills, been taking pain pills all night, sitting up all

19

night just waiting to see whether or not four hours had gone

20

by so he could take another one.

21

pills.

22

Dr. Schmitz said his pain was

This guy doesn't take pain

By the time he got to the hospital, Dr. Sophey saw

23

him, the pain pills were working.

You've heard Mr. Lyon

24

testify, I mean, if he's a liar, why would be testify as he

25

did that the pain pills gave him a great deal of relief, the
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1

shots of pain medication in the hospital gave him a great

2

deal of relief, that it stopped the pain while he was taking

3

the shots.

4

gave him, one of the shots made his face feel like it was

5

elongated and yet they would say, Well, you didn't really

6

have any pain because Dr. Sophey just recorded pain was not

7

significant after he was under the pain administration.

8

One of the pain pills or pain medications they

And the same thing with respect to the records

9

while he was in the hospital.

He didn't say he was in

10

excruciating pain the whole time he was in the hospital.

11

said that the pain medication that they were administering in

12

the hospital, gave him a great deal of relief, even got rid

13

of the pain.

14

five months, couldn't lay down for five minutes.

15

He

When he went home he continued to that pain for

Now if Mr. Lyon is lying, why would he be lying?

I

16

submit the only reason I can think of that he would lie would

17

be to get more money in this case.

18

would he tell you under oath that he was thrilled after five

19

months had gone by and he didn't have the pain any more?

20

could lay down.

21

Would we have anyway of knowing if he said otherwise?

22

said, No, I still can't sleep, I still have to sit up to

23

sleep, I still have pain in my chest, there's no way to

24

measure that if he were lying, he'd be over exaggerating his

25

pain.
I

If he wanted to lie, why

He

He hurried into his wife's room to tell her.
If he
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1

Likewise is arm pain.

The doctors have testified

2

that his blood clots m

3

his arm and it's lower arm, not m

4

shoulder, it's m

5

because as we all learned m

6

circulatory system works is the arteries take the blood down

7

all the way to the tips of our fingers and then it come back

8

through the veins.

9

brachial artery in the lower arm.
the arm.

his arm became chronic.

the elbow, not m

the

the lower arm and that's significant
high school, the way the

His clot is here, his clot is here in the
The swelling is going to

10

be m

11

to what Dr. Bryan did on November 28.

12

That vein in

It's not in the shoulder and (inaudible) as

It became permanent.

It appears to be permanent.

13

You may decide otherwise but Mr. Lyon has told you it's got a

14

lot better.

15

coming in here now and telling you it still hurts, I can't

16

raise it, I can't do anything any more that I used to could

17

do.

18

he'd be saying it still hurts and we'd have no way of

19

knowing.

20

still bothers him from time to time.

21

just the other day coiling up an extension cord holding the

22

reel in his left and pulling the cord and his arm started to

23

bother him and he had to put it down.

24

discomfort and pain he's telling you about now.

25

people over exaggerating.

He said his arm hurt for two years.

He's not

If he were a liar and wanted to increase his damages,

You know, he says, he says he's gotten better,
I think he said he was

That's the kind of
I've seen

He's not.
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1

So let's look at what the evidence is.

I won't

2

bore you with what happened on what was discussed on the

3

18th.

4

informed consent,

5

elected to have it done.

6

done, or didn't decide to have it done because he was not

7

told about blood clots.

8

says no time, neither October 31st nor November 11th, before

9

the second surgery did Dr. Bryan say anything to him about

This case is not about whether or not John Lyon gave
John Lyon went in for elective surgery and
He didn't decide not to have it

But it is important that John Lyon

10

blood clots, in any way, shape or form, never said anything

11

about blood clots.

12

possibility of pulmonary embolism which are blood clots in

13

the lung, never told him anything about that and that's

14

important because if we're going to look at notes versus

15

sworn testimony, we've got to look at some things about

16

notes.

17

learn this, is that Dr. Bryan puts in phony notes in his

18

patient's charts.

19

and October 31 are not important because John Lyon was or was

20

not told about the risk of blood clots.

21

because they're identical.

He never said anything about the

One of the things we've learned - I was shocked to

These documents, the notes of November 11

These are important

I was surprised when I saw that

22 J they were identical and I talked to you about that in opening
23

statement.

We now heard from Dr. Bryan that they're

24

identical because they're phony.

25

to push a key on every patient's file and put this identical

He just tells his assistant
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1

record in every patient's file.

2

upon the notes of Dr. Bryan because they don't say anything

3

about a swollen arm on 11/28.

4

Yet they want us to rely

In fact, I looked through, I think we only have

5

about eight clinical notes of Dr. Bryan.

Four them he's

6

admitted are phony and what's his answer to that?

7

says, I know lots of doctors put in these phony notes and

8

some of their phony notes are longer than my phony notes.

9

The point about this case is that you've got to look at notes

Well, he

10

for what they are.

11

notes or your notes.

12

put things in that weren't there.

13

I don't know about Dr. Sophey or anyone else, but I sort of

14

summarize in the notes as to what somebody told me or what I

15

observed and my summary may actually, when it comes down to

16

close scrutiny, be slightly different from what was actually

17

said or what was actually observed.

18

Notes of doctors are no better than my
Notes can leave things out, notes can

So now we have memory.

I don't know about you and

Is the memory what you

19

actually remember or is the memory what the notes refresh

20

your recollection?

21

the note that you didn't have before or are you just looking

22

at the note and relying upon what you normally do?

23

you normally would say something about swelling and it isn't

24

in that note, then I must not have had anybody tell me about

25 J swelling.

You now have recollection separate from

And if

Dr. Bryan stands up before you and said, right up
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1

to the jury box and said, I just don't know m

hindsight what

2

I could have done differently.

3

have done differently, to pay attention to what his patient

4

says.

5

nurse first and they bring in the nurse whose kind of a non-

6

event.

7

and a half years and the best she's going to offer for him is

8

she doesn't remember.

9

would have remembered if the man had said my arm is really

I'll tell him what he could

Mr. and Mrs. Lyon said that John went in told the

She works for Dr. Bryan, has worked for him for four

She did say that it's something she

10

swollen and hurts but she didn't remember, doesn't mean

11

anything other than she doesn't remember.

12

Mr. and Mrs. Lyon both say that John told the nurse

13

and the nurse said tell the doctor and he told the doctor, he

14

said, Doctor, my arm is really swollen. I'm m

15

like it's going to pop. I feel like somebody has put an air

16

hose in my arm and both of them say Dr. Bryan didn't even

17

look at his arm.

18

the experts that have come in have said the lumps had any

19

consequence but it's still, there's nothing in the notes on

20

the 28th about lumps in the arm, nothing about pain in the

21

arm, nothing about the arm being swollen.

22

He said he had lumps m

Mrs. Lyon says she was there.

pain.

his arm.

I feel

None of

We've got a

23

corroborating witness.

24

swollen doctor, it hurts, feels like it's going to pop, feels

25

like there's an air hose m

I

She heard her husband say, my arm is

it, I've got lumps in my elbow
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1

and they both say Dr. Bryan didn't even look at it.

2

Mr. Lyon says under oath that to him his arm looked the same

3

on the 28th and felt the same on the 28th as it did on the 2nd

4

when he saw Dr. Schmitz.

5

I think all of the experts have agreed that Dr.

6

Schmitz did a great job, he probably saved John's life and he

7

saw the same thing, saw painful, swollen arm, twice as big as

8

the other arm, three plus on a scale of four for edema and he

9

immediately sent him to radiology to find out whether or not

10
11

he had a blood clot, and he did.
Now the defense seems to be that, well, there's

12

somewhere else in Dr. Schmitz' notes where he says no

13

deformity in the elbow and the elbow wasn't swollen and hot.

14

So this means what?

15

the stand under oath, that this man's arm was twice as big as

16

his other arm, that this man had a terribly swollen arm, that

17

Dr. Schmitz is lying?

18

counteracts that?

19

he swore under oath.

20

When Dr. Schmitz when he testifies on

That some note about the elbow

I don't think so.

Dr. Schmitz testified,

He said another very important thing in deciding

21

whether or not John is lying and it's not in his notes.

He

22

said, I distinctly remember that John Lyon told me on the 2nd

23

that he had shown that very swollen arm to Dr. Bryan before

24

he came to see me.

I don't think Dr. Schmitz knew it was the

25 J 28th, three days before, four days before, five days before
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1

but he had a distinct recollection and it's not in his notes.

2

Does that mean is recollection

3

think so.

4

swollen arm to Dr. Bryan, long before any lawsuit, long

5

before John Lyon even knew what was wrong with him. He's

6

corroborating with Dr. Schmitz' sworn testimony that he had

7

that swollen arm.

8
9

is not to be trusted?

1 don't

He said John Lyon told me that he had shown this

Now I think and I think that this is the most
important piece of evidence in all of this, as to whether or

10

not John and Mary Lyon are liars and that is Mary Lyon

11

testified under oath that days, two or three days before the

12

appointment of November 28, before the appointment with Dr.

13

Bryan, John's arm was swollen, John was in pain.

14

so much pain, his arm was so swollen she was rubbing it and

15

putting heat on it.

16

a catch in her voice, started to break up because she then

17

said, I later found out that was the worst thing to do. And

18

yet the defense suggests she's a liar.

19

He was in

I don't know if you remember but she got

I think John is a tough guy and then Mary said two

20

or three days before the 28th, let's go see the doctor, your

21

arm is so swollen and sore, I'm rubbing it, putting heat on

22

it, let's go see a doctor.

23

appointment on the 28th, let's just shown him the arm then.

24

That's a liar?

John says, no, I've got an

Mrs. Lyon is a liar?

I'm sorry that - I'm

25 J sorry I feel so strongly about this but I have a great
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1

respect for what people say under oath and the challenge you

2

can put to that with cross examination.

3

The evidence in this case is overwhelming, John

4

Lyon has a swollen, painful arm on the 28th and before that.

5

He told Dr. Bryan, he told the nurse and they did nothing.

6

Didn't even look at his arm, came into the room, John says my

7

arm is really swollen - he says, How you doing?

8

arm is really swollen, hurts, feels like it's going to pop,

9

glanced maybe at his arm and then took the bandage off, took

He says my

10

the sling off, looked at the shoulder where the surgery had

11

been done.

12

note is to be believed, looking at the sites of the surgery.

13

Apparently checks sensation in his hand if the

Let's give Dr. Bryan some benefit of the doubt.

I

14

don't think he really remembers that visit.

I don't really

15

know from his testimony when I was cross examining him,

16

exactly how that all finally came out.

17

patients that day.

18

one, even one of the other patients, what they said?

19

said, I would have to look at my notes.

20

Bryan heard John when he said, my arm is painful, it's

21

swollen.

22

Dr. Bryan is moving from one patient to another, seeing 30 to

23

50, has seen hundreds, even thousands by the time he knew

He had 30 to 50

I asked him, Well, can you remember any
He

I don't think Dr.

1 don't know why that didn't register with him.

24 I there was any issue over what he saw on that day.

He comes

25 | in and he's got a man who has undergone surgery and he wants
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1

to look at the surgical wounds and I don't think he was

2

paying attention to John Lyon, and that's negligence.

3

Their own expert, Dr. Vanderhooft, he said this

4

morning right on the stand, if he had the same swollen arm -

5

in fact I think he said if he had an significantly swollen

6

arm on the 28th it would be a breach of the standard of care

7

of doctors in this community not to send him, not to send

8

John to radiology to find out if he had a blood clot or if

9

there was infection developing from surgery.

10

Dr. Vanderhooft, very, very carefully limited his

11

direct testimony and his opinion to his reading of the chart,

12

the record, the notes and specifically he relied upon three

13

doctor notes more than anything.

14

notes and said, Well, he doesn't say anything about swelling,

15

so there must not have been any.

16

significant swelling.

17

swelling, it doesn't say there's normal swelling.

18

nothing about swelling at all.

19

He relied on Dr. Bryan's

Then (inaudible)

Well, it doesn't say there's minor
There's

And then they go into this 3-day duration defense

20

and on December 2, Dr. Schmitz says in his notes, the swollen

21

arm was of three days duration.

22

do you count the days, 28th to 29th, one day, 29th to 30th is

23

two days, 30th to the 1st is three days and it's now the

24

fourth day, it was three days duration and that takes it back

25

to when Mr. Lyon say Dr. Bryan.

Then we got into some, how

But it doesn't matter.

I
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1

don't know if you remember, but what counsel, while Mr.

2

Epperson and I were fencing back and forth over this 3-day

3

duration note, Dr. Schmitz was shaking his head and I finally

4

asked him, why are you shaking your head and he said

5

this is not the point.

6

say weeks, I didn't say months, I said the duration of this

7

swollen arm was days.

8

three.

9

have been six.

cause

The point is I said days, I didn't

It doesn't mean anything that I put

It could have been four, could have been five, could
You're just making too big a deal out of

10

this.

11

and make such a big deal.

12

A

You can't just take one thing out of all these notes

Dr. Sophey, by the way, he said about three days.

13

About three days could be four days, could be two days.

14

don't know what that means.

15

This is just a interesting little note.

I

If these

16

notes are so important, this is Dr. Alder on December 2, he's

17

the radiologist who Dr. Schmitz sent John to and he's the one

18

who determined that there was a pulmonary blood clot, a lung

19

blood clot and then it says down here in comment, "findings

20

were discussed with Dr. Schmitz immediately following the

21

examination by (inaudible).

22

faxed to his office.

23

report immediately to the emergency room."

24

means he was instructed.

25

to the emergency room some clever lawyer could be taking that

A preliminary report was also

The patient has been obstructed to
Of course he

But had John Lyon died on the way
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1

note and saying, Well, he was obstructed from getting to the

2

emergency room, it was Ogden Clinic that caused the problem,

3

not Dr. Bryan.

4

entire picture and you can't read one note without regard to

5

the sworn testimony.

6

You can't over read into one note out of the

Dr. Schmitz testified what he saw.

John Lyon

7

testified his arm was the same that day as it was on the

8

28th.

9

seeing an arm like that and Dr. Vanderhooft said, you know,

Dr. Schmitz, everybody agrees did the right thing,

10

this thing on numb hands, that's not relevant.

11

I don't know how many times we've gone into John Lyon writing

12

a note that said his hand wasn't numb and saying under oath

13

that he thought his hand was numb.

14

hand was numb.

15

other than it's something you would expect a doctor to look

16

at if he said I had lumps in my arm and John and Mary Lyon

17

said Dr. Bryan didn't even look at his arm.

18

We've gone -

It doesn't matter if his

It doesn't matter if he had lumps in his arm

Now, the only thing that's important is here's a

19

man with a swollen, painful arm.

20

prospect of a blood clot.

That immediately raises the

Now we all agree it's rare, but

21 i it's 100 percent when it happens to a patient and none of
22

these doctors, even Dr. Vanderhooft didn't say because it's

23

rare I wouldn't be concerned if I saw the swollen arm.

24

Vanderhooft this morning testifying on behalf of the

25

defendant, Dr. Bryan, Dr. Vanderhooft said, if Mr. Lyon's arm

I

Dr.
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1

was swollen on the 28th it would be a violation of the

2

standard of care not to send Mr. Lyon for further followup to

3

find out if he had a blood clot.

4

that simple.

5

everything else, forget about rarity, it's a red herring as

6

to whether this is rare or not, it's something these doctors

7

are taught in medical school.

8

it is?

9

they all have agreed that it's something you've got to watch

10

out for and had Mr. Lyon, as he testified under oath he did,

11

had this swollen, painful arm, it should have been treated on

12

the 28th and it's negligence not to do that.

It's that simple.

It's

If he had a swollen arm, forget about

Why do they all know how rare

It's because they are taught it in medical school and

13

So that's the case, the significant point in a
What was John Lyon's arm like on the 28th?

14

nutshell.

Is he

15

now coming in here and lying that he didn't have a swollen

16

arm on the 28th or is he telling the truth, he had a swollen

17

arm, told Dr. Bryan about it and Dr. Bryan didn't even look

18

at it, checked the wound out.

19

you do and he said I don't know, I'll have to go check my

20

notes, comes back 15 minutes later and says, everything looks

21

okay and Dr. Bryan is off to the next of the 30, 50 patients

22

he's seeing that day.

23

when he stands up here and says I don't know in hindsight

24

what I could do differently, that's an easy answer for you,

25

for me.

John Lyon then said, what did

Doesn't mean he's a bad doctor, but

He can listen to his patient.

He can look at the
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1

arm when the guy says my arm is swollen.

2

I think Dr. Bryan is a very proud man and I think

3

he may have some denial when he goes back and looks at his

4

notes and says I didn't say swollen, so it must not have been

5

swollen and I don't know what I can do if it wasn't swollen

6

and nobody is saying he should have done anything if it

7

wasn't swollen.

8

the radiology for a sonagram if they come in after surgery

9

and have some surgical swelling.

We're not asking him to send everybody to

We're asking him to listen

10

to his patients and if the patient says I've got a sore,

11

swollen arm following surgery, look at it, feel it, measure

12

it, make a note about it or if it's not, make a note that

13

it's not, patient complaints of swollen arm, checked it and

14

it looks okay.

15

There's a very interesting little piece of evidence

16

on Dr. Bryan's notes and that is John Lyon some six months

17

later, May of 2006 went in to get a copy of all of Dr.

18

Bryan's notes.

19

assistant there, probably Ms. Brockbrader, he asks her for

20

the notes and she says, Oh, you're in luck, we just finished

21

getting those into the computer.

22

time that Mr. Lyon had seen Dr. Bryan and it is, I think it's

23

months even from the time he very last saw Dr. Bryan.

24

heard Dr. Bryan say I don't take hand notes.

25

dictate them.

I

This is six months later and walks in and the

This is months from the

You

I just go and

If he's preparing these notes after, he's
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preparing them in May or even April, this is after he knows
that John Lyon has been in the hospital with a pulmonary
embolism.

All the doctors agree that a pulmonary embolism is

life threatening, potentially life threatening.
didn't die.

John luckily

I'd be standing here a lot more unhappy.

It's

rare but it's life threatening.
Counsel like to talk about hoofbeats and if you
hear hoofbeats you're going to assume it's a horse instead of
a zebra and Dr. Serfustini if it's Christmas time, it's a
reindeer.

The point is, these hoofbeats weren't checked out.

Dr. Bryan made no effort to find out if it was a reindeer or
a zebra and these hoofbeats were a thundering herd heading
straight for John Lyon.
John, if there's one thing that ought to be clear
is that John is a tough guy.

I think we heard that he had

his leg broken in an accident where a friend fell off a
snowmobile and the snowmobile crashed into his snowmobile,
pinned his leg against the snowmobile, turns out he broke it.
He walked around on for six6 months with a broken leg before
he saw a doctor.

He saw Dr. Schmitz, Dr. Schmitz said,

you've got a broken leg, it's healing on its own.
surgery on his elbow, went to work the next day.

He had
My gosh, he

had discs removed in his neck and plates put in and his neck
fused and he drove his grandkids to Disneyland the next day.
But please don't confuse John Lyon being able to put up with
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1

the pain, more pain than I could.

2

the pain and suffering that was occasioned in this case.

3

Don't confuse that with

Now, you've heard the instruction that John must

4

prove negligence and that that negligence caused his problem.

5

I don't think there's any dispute in the testimony that it

6

was more likely than not that the inattention to the blood

7

clot on November 28 that was in his arm, resulted in the clot

8

hitting his lung, all of the pain that that caused.

9

pain alone, that pain alone for 5 months, what's that worth?

That

10

There was some suggestion in opening and I suppose Mr.

11

Epperson may hit it again that, Gee, the clot would have been

12

in his arm anyway, he still had these problems with his arm,

13

doesn't matter whether it was diagnosed on the 28th or the

14

2nd.

15

the medication for clots stops the formation of further

16

clots.

17

During that four days the clotting continued to the point it

18

threw one into his lung.

19

his arm today.

20

years of constant pain and throbbing in his arm.

21

started to get some relief.

22

I submit because he's a tough guy and will tough out pain,

23

doesn't mean that there wasn't pain and suffering caused by

24

Dr. Bryan's negligence, if you find Dr. Bryan was negligent.

25

It does.

You heard the testimony.

The testimony is

He did not have that medication for four days.

That affected his arm, that affects

What's that worth?

John says he had two
He has

He didn't like taking drugs but

John doesn't come in as I said earlier and tell you
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1

now that he still can't use his arm, he can't do the things

2

he used to do, that he's virtually useless because of his

3

arm.

4

says it's gotten a lot better.

5

at all, most days it's just a couple of times during the day.

6

But it's gone on for a lot of years now and it's up for you

7

to - up to you to decide whether or not it's likely to

8

continue for the rest of his life.

9

He has to pay somebody to mow his lawn and - no, he
Some days it doesn't both him

You heard the testimony from Dr. Schmitz and Dr.

10

Serfustini that given the sonagram that was done five months

11

later, six months later, May of 2006 that showed that this

12

brachial artery was clotted and another brachial vein, excuse

13

me, was clotted still and another vein was clotted still,

14

that that would cause continuing pain.

15

suggestionm yeah, but there's other veins that drain the arm

16

but that doesn't mean this vein isn't there for a reason.

17

John says the pain that he has now is in this forearm, top of

18

his forearm and his bicep.

19

like the pain that was in his neck from before and after the

20

neck surgery.

21

doctors, both Dr. Schmitz and Dr. Serfustini said, that's

22

consistent with not having complete blood flow through the

23

veins.

24

form.

25

collateral just means your body just makes other veins,

There was some

It's a muscle pain.

It's not like a tennis elbow pain.

It's not

From the

Dr. Schmitz said that over time, collaterals may
Some people don't form them, others do and the
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1

branch out to go around the part that isn't working.

2

that may still happen with John.

3

consideration the possibility that this could be a much

4

longer term discomfort to him.

5

And

But you have to take into

John went back to see Dr. Bryan a month later,

6

December 28.

Dr. Bryan came in and he said, Did you hear

7

what happened to me?

8

and John said, I told you when I was m

9

swollen and I ended up in the hospital with blood clots and

Dr. Bryan said, I think somebody called
here my arm was

10

what's the evidence of what Dr. Bryan said back?

Did he say

11

I'm sorry it happened to you, forget about whether or not he

12

thought he was at fault, did he say I'm sorry that happened

13

to you?

14

John and I said if I send everybody that has swelling to

15

x-ray, x-ray would be clogged up and nobody could use it.

16

think that's consistent with what Dr. Bryan was saying on the

17

stand.

18

I don't think he was even asked about the meeting with John

19

Lyon on the 28th of December but he was asked, he was asked

20

something and he said right to you, I can't send everybody to

21

x-ray.

22

they'll be clogged up, and then said something like I've got

23

to worry about our insurance rates, the health insurance

24

crisis and everything.

25

with a little swelling around the wound where he had the

No, the testimony is he raised his voice, glared at

I

He said something like, I think he said on the stand,

Sound familiar9

I can't send everybody to x-ray,

Well, that may be if a person is in
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1

surgery.

But that's not the case when it's life threatening

2

or potentially life threatening no matter how rare that may

3

be, John Lyon was not just another person to send tc x-ray

4

post surgery.

5

that a few days later when he saw Dr. Schmitz, Dr. Schmitz

6

sent him to radiology and they confirmed.

7

testified and said Dr. Schmitz did the right thing.

8

even Dr. Vanderhooft said that had the same presentation on

9

the arm along, forget about the blood clot in the lung, on

John Lyon had a sore, swollen arm and we know

All the doctors
I think

10

the arm alone, had Dr. Bryan seen the same thing that Dr.

11

Schmitz saw, he should have sent him to radiology and that

12

would have done it.

13

the blood clot, get him on Heparin, stop any further clots

14

from forming, reduce greatly the risk that a clot would break

15

loose and go to his lung and cause a potential life

16

threatening event.

That's all it would have taken, diagnose

17

This, of course, means a lot to both parties, this

18

case means a lot to John Lyon but I would submit to you also

19

in trying to decide is he somebody just in here trying to

20

make a buck, he hasn't sued anybody before, ever, hasn't made

21

a claim ever.

22

even told him.

23

this case, must be lying because Dr. Bryan didn't put

24

anything in his notes that day about a swollen, painful arm?

25

The guy that smashed his snowmobile, he hasn't
John Lyon is, according to the defense of

John Lyon was rear-ended, had a rear-end collision,
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1

sitting with his wife driving and a vehicle ran into them,

2

rear-end, went to the hospital with whiplash symptoms.

3

didn't make any claim, he didn't make any claim to anybody.

4

This guy, if he's - I just submit to you that you cannot,

5

from the evidence and from what you're seen of John, what you

6

know of his history, you can't decide that John Lyon is lying

7

and Mary Lyon is lying, Mary Lyon wasn't rubbing his arm two

8

or three days before he saw Dr. Bryan.

9

Well, what's all that worth, you know?

John

It's -

10

can't put evidence on, can't bring in charts.

11

could bring in old lawyers for days in the courtroom to tell

12

you what their experience has been on what cases are worth

13

but it's really just up to you and you're not to do this out

14

of any sympathy for join or anger against Dr. Bryan.

15

asking that, John's not asking that.

16

justice.

17

calm, consideration and if you find that Dr. Bryan was

18

negligent, return damages to John that will fairly compensate

19

for what he went through.

20

I guess we

I'm not

John just wants

We just want you to use your fair, compassionate,

When I was a young lawyer I was always quite shy

21

about telling the jury the number I had in my mind and after

22

years I had lots of jurors say why didn't you tell us, we

23

wanted to know but it's just a suggestion.

24

just Scott Savage just making a suggestion and I suggest this

25

case is worth $450,000 for this pain and suffering damage.

This is just me,
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1

You may think it should be higher, you may think it should be

2

lower and I'll tell you, I'll accept whatever number you in

3

your collective judgment think is appropriate.

4

beautiful system we have.

5

collective recall is better than mine, better than Mr.

6

Epperson.

7

I also (inaudible) from years of experience, I think

8

(inaudible) jurors can be better than judges.

9

It's a

It's an ingenious system.

Your

Your collective judgement is better than mine and

I get a chance to talk to you briefly after Mr.

10

Epperson and I will look forward to that.

11

briefer than this one.

12

evidence, you've heard enough from me but I thank you again

13

for your time and attention and I hope as you walk out of

14

here, after you've reached a verdict, you think this was a

15

good experience, that it showed you something about our

16

system that's a little different from watching the OJ trial

17

or Judge Judy and I hope you gain just one small measure of

18

the respect I have for the system.

19

look forward to talking to you briefly again.

I think you've heard all the

20

THE COURT:

21

Mr. Epperson?

22

MR. EPPERSON:

23

boards, Mr. Savage?

I'll keep it much

Thank you very much.

I

Thank you.

Thank you.

Could you remove your

Would you mind?

24

MR. SAVAGE:

25

MR. EPPERSON:

Oh sure.

I would appreciate it very much.
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1

MR. SAVAGE:

2

MR. EPPERSON:

You would appreciate (inaudible).
At the beginning of this case,

3

ladies and gentlemen of the jury and everyone here, I

4

indicated that this was an important case for my client, Dr.

5

Bryan, who spent over 32 years here serving in this community

6

providing orthopedic care to many, many patients.

7

difficult for a physician to be accused of malpractice.

8

Dr. Bryan has been here to try to respond to the allegations

9

that have been brought.

10

It's
And

From the suggestion that you just heard that this

11

case would be reasonable for $450,000 I think you can better

12

appreciate why we're here today.

13

negligence on the part of Dr. Bryan, but those sorts of

14

figures are totally, I would suggest unsupported by the facts

15

in evidence.

16

as to why Dr. Bryan is here today not only challenging

17

liability but damages.

Not only do we dispute

But I think it will give you an understanding

18

I've always had a good feel working in my law

19

office, in the building and in the very office where my

20

great-grandfather started practice in June of 18 95.

21

many historic things from that early era.

22

cherished as a young man is before he and his brother passed

23

away who started the firm, he always spoke with great

24

reverence to the statue that was put up shortly after he

25

began practice on the southern spire of the City and County
I

We have

But one thing I
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1

Building m

downtown Salt Lake City and on that spire is a

2

beautiful statue of what's called Lady Justice.

3

is depicted standing with a blindfold on, not that she is

4

blind but it's symbolic that she not be distracted by things

5

that should not distract her in dispensing justice or the law

6

and one of the jury instructions - and I'm going to highlight

7

instructions as I weave in the facts, because the Court has

8

instructed you that he instructs you as to law which you must

9

apply but you are the exclusive finders of fact.

Lady Justice

There are

10

some real factual disputes in this case.

I've never called

11

anyone a liar but there are factual disputes, a lot of them

12

and that's why you are here.

13

all we can do is present the evidence and let you decide who

14

is most credible and where justice should be.

15

Instruction No. 9, "This case must not be decided for or

16

against anyone because you feel sorry or angry at anyone.

17

It's your duty to decide this case based on the facts and the

18

law without regard to sympathy, passion, prejudice or public

19

(inaudible)."

20

Justice with regard to the blindfold.

21

jury voir dire, you were questioned about your willingness to

22

serve and to apply the law.

23

so much you're responding positively to was your commitment

24

that you would not let the natural sympathy that we all feel

25

for misfortune, complications or bad things happening to good

You are the finders of fact and

But the jury

Once again, that is the symbolism of Lady
And so that's why

m

One question that I appreciated
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1

people affect your judgment because that's the symbolism of

2

the blindfold, not being distracted by things that you

3

shouldn't be.

4

You are now judges, you're not advocates.

Another jury instruction that I think has always

5

been so significant to me is the burden of proof because in

6

the American system of justice they allow anyone essentially

7

to file a complaint in the courts and to make an allegation

8

and if the defendant, such as Dr. Bryan does not file an

9

answer within 30 days or 20 days, then a default judgment is

10

taken against them.

So, a defendant must step forward, get

11

counsel, appear and defend himself against allegations in a

12

civil system and because of that, the law says it's only fair

13

to put what's called the burden of proof upon that plaintiff,

14

upon that party who is invoking the legal system and causing

15

the defendant to appear and so the burden of proof is so

16

beautifully depicted, also by Lady Justice, because she is

17

holding and I'm sure you're seen those statues or pictures, a

18

balance scale in her hands, symbolic of weighing the evidence

19

and the instruction that the Court has given you on burden of

20

proof are in Instruction No. 19.

21

kind of clump together and so I put together 19, 20 and 18

22

essentially, they're all burden of proof instructions and it

23

comments that in 19, "A party seeking to prove a fact bears

24

the burden of proof.

25

truth of the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence.

A lot of these instructions

In doing so, the party must prove the
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1

Unless the evidence so preponderates in support of that

2

allegation of fact, you shall find that the allegation is not

3

true/'

4

What does it mean by preponderates?

I think the

5

Special Verdict Form describes it as good as anything.

6

Eventually you're asked to answer a question or two

7

questions.

8

will say, if you find the evidence is so equally balance that

9

you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, then, -

It's called the verdict form and the verdict form

10

or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the

11

issue presented, answer no.

12

Donald Bryan M.D. negligent?

13

evidence is evenly balanced, plaintiffs loose and why is

14

that?

15

implementing the cost, the expense, the hardship, the

16

heartache of a system in defense, they need to prevail on

17

their proof.

18

essentially to answer no to Dr. Bryan's negligence, even if

19

it's equal.

20

Question, was the defendant,
In other words, if even the

Because our system of justice requires that someone

If not, you've been instructed by the Court

As far as your role as witnesses, I mean dealing

21

with witnesses, there's an Instruction No. 12 that says

22

you're the exclusive judges of the credibility of the

23

witnesses and the weight to give the evidence.

24

unique role and why we need you and what a wonderful system

25

the jury system is.

That's your

As I see you from so many backgrounds,
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1

walks of life, education, it's an amazing system.

A Judge

2

can be wonderful but he may have his own events. To get eight

3

people and an alternate, altogether who can collectively have

4

their wisdom, their background and to find justice is a

5

unique part of our government and constitution.

6

collectively are to consider the evidence.

7

conduct while testifying, their frankness, their capacity to

8

remember.

9

believe that a witness on some former occasion made

And so you

The witness's

You've been instructed, for example, "You may

10

statements inconsistent with that witness's testimony given

11

here in this case.

12

credibility of the witness is for you to determine.

13

believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any

14

material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of

15

that witness except as that witness may have been

16

corroborated by other credible evidence."

17

The effect of such evidence upon the
If you

Now, I've been doing this a lot of years and I

18

don't have too many what I call Perry Mason moments in trial.

19

Now some of the younger jurors are going to have to ask what

20

I mean by Perry Mason moments.

21

about Perry Mason, the lawyer, and he would have some amazing

22

concessions from witnesses at trial and it would make a great

23

TV drama.

24

improved but I actually had one in this case.

25

this courtroom and you folks saw it.

That's an old movie - show

At least it was per the era.

I think TV has
I had one in

And what do I mean by
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1

that?

We emphasized the testimony in the deposition, that is

2

that on November 28 the crux of this presentation, where what

3

was said and done became so important, we had Mr. Lyon asked

4

on direct examination, now you work for the railroad, you're

5

a notetaker.

6

memory and that's what you've done in your business.

7

believe those, are the accurate, are they (inaudible)?

8

essentially (inaudible).

9

Well, some started about a month after when it's fresh and

Why do you take notes?

Oh, to refresh your
Can you
Yes,

When did you take notes after this?

10

it's credible and so then we go to a deposition m

2008, not

11

December now, late December of

12

a deposition under oath.

13

absolutely told that nurse I have swelling and this hand is

14

"totally numb" and by the way, there's pressure and it's like

15

a pressure hose and it feels like it's going to burst.

16

are specific important allegations.

17

plaintiff said, have been suggesting, all bears upon what

18

this patient told the doctor on the 28th and one of those key

19

things that they were so sure of was the numbness of the

20

hand, I thought that was important information.

21

the deposition is taken, we get this statement and I'm able

22

to compare the statement that was done a month later and then

23

I suggest at that time, wow, that's not consistent with the

24

deposition testimony and so in court here as we start to read

25

this, which I think Lt's a reasonable inquiry, I asked to be

x

05 but in ^08 or so and take

Four times I get testimony, I

These

So as this case as

Well, after
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1

read, Okay, the statement that was made in December just

2

weeks after this, you're describing the events of the 15th

3

after the surgery, after he performed surgery on my rotator

4

cuff, left hand, etc., he talks about November 18 he returned

5

to his office, removed the bandages, we'll ask him what he

6

actually did to my shoulder and they were saying he didn't

7

really tell me what he did to my shoulder much, I had to keep

8

asking and asking.

9

right in the statement from three or four weeks later, it

Remember that in discovery?

And yet

10

talks about how he explained what he had done.

11

asked him what he actually did to my shoulder and he said, I

12

pulled it together and also repaired a lateral tear.

13

said, "I had done three rotator cuffs that day and I will

14

need to check my surgical notes to see, to be sure what was

15

done.

16

knowing for sure what was done.

17

this comment.

18

that Mr. Lyon said, why am I keeping these notes?

19

thought I was going to die

20

testimony or there was a chance.

21

someone who within weeks is so concerned about preserving

22

testimony, would do it as accurately as they can.

23

be fresher on their mind.

24

read through this, "We returned on November 28 to remove the

25

stitches from my left hand and index finger.

He left the room, he got busy.

It says, we

Then he

We later left not

That's what they said, made

But then, we returned on November 28, remember
He said, I

and I needed to preserve this
It would seem to me that

It would

So as I read then, or have him

The nurse
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1

arrived in the room, Karen? Kathy? Not sure of her name, she

2

asked how I was doing.

3

hasn't been going numb" and you recall as he read that he

4

said, oh, that should have said, has been going numb and but

5

then it says although, which is not going to match with

6

hasn't - "although my left arm was very swollen and there

7

were lumps in it.

8

She said, I'll have to have the man remove three because I

9 J can't get them.

I told her with Mary present, my hand

She then started to remove the stitches.

I told her she could and she said, I'm a

10

digger, I like digging.

11

and then after clarification we turn it over.

12

then arrived, he asked how I was and I told him the same as I

13

said to his nurse, my hand wasn't going numb although my arm

14

was very swollen with lumps.

15

She eventually got them out."

Well,

The doctor

I would suggest that the very best evidence of

16

those records that were in existence, for example, before a

17

lawsuit was filed or contemplated, the treatment records of

18

the three physicians that Dr. Vanderhooft relied upon, these

19

notes were very early when memory would have been fresh.

20

I think what's credible is not only the issue of the hand on

21

these notes because this is the documented notes in case I

22

die or what happened on the 28th.

23

think it's important to read through some of the rest of

24

this.

25

He then took off the sling from my left arm and slowly lifted

So

We read through it and I

"Okay, he checked my hands and asked about movement.
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1

it upward.

It was only able to reach even with my head.

My

2

only previous instructions from 18 th of November was to

3

rotate my arm like a pendulum and use my right hand to lift

4

my left arm up four times daily, use the left fingers to walk

5

like a spider up the wall while lifting with the right hand.

6

He says that I should continue at least four times daily.

7

The only other instructions we had was keep the sling on for

8

six weeks until December 28 and no lifting.

9

the doctor what was actually done.

I again asked

He - can't read that -

10

and got the surgical notes and said he repaired a large

11

lateral tear, nothing was ever said about the swelling or the

12

lumps in the arm.

13

recuperation."

14

they're recording three or four weeks later Mr. Lyon what was

15

discussed, is there any complaint on the face of this whole

16

narrative referencing pain?

17

yeah, I'm swollen.

18

note about pressure?

19

There's none.

20

and through other things your memory does change or in an

21

effort to achieve a $450,000 recovery, that there's

So Mary and I figured it was part of

Well, I think it's significant that

None.

as

It just says I'm swollen,

Is there any suggestion on this entire
About popping?

About pressure hose?

And so one begins to wonder if through time

22 I additional emphasis placed.
23

But this is why you are the exclusive fact finders.

24

That's your exclusive role.

All I can do as a defense

25

lawyer, I never considered myself that clever.

All I can do
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1

is try to get the records, put them in front of you and let

2

you decide-

3

Bryan that what you did on the 28th is the basis of this

4

lawsuit, then show the notes and what would support him?

5

testimony and his note of the 28th, what does it say?

6

Sensation in his hand is intact.

7

supports Dr. Bryan.

8

this morning with Dr. Vanderhooft, I felt it so important to

9

emphasize that you know, this whole case of the plaintiffs

But how would you defend on a claim against Dr.

His

Well, I think now this note

This was an accurate note and that's why

10

is built upon this chair with four legs and one of those legs

11

was I told him that I was totally numb, therefore, the index

12

of suspicion should be higher.

13

that out.

14

how painful this was.

15

narrative of pain.

16

know from these products, they're as much for swelling as

17

they are for pain, yet they have dual purposes and in any

18

event, there's nothing about pain here.

19

pain.

20

degree and I think it's so important that Dr. Vanderhooft

21

said, I see them at eight days because an action of swelling

22

is more like three to seven or whatever.

23

a little compulsive.

24

after that.

25

of care.

Well, I think we've ruled

And so what's the next thing?

I told them about

There is no mention on the entire

Switching from Ibuprofen to Voltaren, you

I'm sure he had some

I'm sure he had swelling, but the question is one of

Well, Dr. Bryan is

He saw him at three and then ten days

I would suggest that may be above the standard

So the pain issue was not supported on that and
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1

again, the bursting and all of those descriptions weren't

2

supported on that as well or in the other records.

3

And then Dr. Bryan said something interesting.

He

4

said, my physical examination and what I did would be

5

inconsistent with a description of, that he gives, of an arm

6

twice as big and swollen the entire length.

7

what it he did.

8

testimony because I think Dr. Vanderhooft shared that.

9

He talks about

And so I think that is the significant

I've got to tell you, I liked Dr. Serfustini and I

10

told you at the beginning of this case that he was perhaps

11

one of my very best witnesses in many respects.

12

it's so rare that I have the luxury of getting, taking a

13

deposition and doing work with a plaintiff's expert and to be

14

able to get him to say everything my client did surgically

15

was great, it was indicated, it was well done, he had a great

16

result, I'd be happy if I got these results.

17

thinking okay, I'm two-thirds of the way home and then I

18

said, well where are your criticisms then Dr. Serfustini?

19

said, Well, a DVT wasn't diagnosed in an upper extremity. And

20

I say okay, have you ever had a DVT in an upper extremity

21

after your incredible career - and he has one, I'll give him

22

that.

23

Well, Dr. Serfustini in all of your years then have you ever

24

sent someone for an ultrasound after these kind of surgeries

25

and he says no.

He agreed,

Well, wow, I'm

He

I like this guy and he said no, I've never had one.

And I'm thinking to myself, I'm not the fact
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1

finder, you are, but I think to myself if the expert brought

2

in has never seen this, has never sent someone for an

3

ultrasound how can they come in here and suggest that my

4

client, Dr. Bryan, should have some prophetic insight to be

5

able to suspect a clot, diagnose it, prevent a pulmonary

6

embolus.

7

You have to weigh that.
So you recall what I did with Dr. Serfustini.

8

said now Dr. Serfustini, I really only ask experts three

9

questions, do you have an opinion?

I

Upon what is it based?

10

And what is it.

The key is upon what is it based.

That

11

includes education, training, work experience.

12

that.

13

you based them on in this case?

14

of this document and if it presents as Dr. Bryan says, he's

15

well within the standard of care.

16

assuming then that might be different?

17

Mr. Lyon or we accept everything that was said, then there's

18

an index of suspicion.

19

The numbness, the pain, and I do think he fudged a little on

20

that.

21

narcotics, Dr. Serfustini.

22

gun.

23

thought Dr. Vanderhooft was much more credible, but again,

24

that's your decision.

Oh, he's got

But then I said, Okay, what are your legs and what do
And he said well on the face

Well, what are you
Well, if we believe

What does Dr. Serfustini include?

I said, now come on, Ibuprofen, Voltaren, that's not
That's not pulling out the big

I was surprised we get this comment on a big gun.

I

To say that no, these are both the

25 I same, it's the Dr. Pepper versus the Coke and this isn't a
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1

narcotic, this isn't pulling out a big gun.

2

red flag that's documented in the record.

3

notes.

4

out from underneath him.

5

So pain isn't a
It wasn't on his

And so the pain was one of his feet that was taken

The numb hand was taken out from underneath him.

6

And he's saying, Well, I'm assuming then that they said about

7

the bursting, the popping and the pressure hose and that

8

would be, you know, something that a doc ought to kind of

9

listen to if it's all said and I think that may be true.

And

10

so although Dr. Vanderhooft said I have people say that and

11

it's not diagnostic but, you know, you might look a little

12

more is kind of what he was saying.

13

I do.

14

suggesting now that the nurse was involved.

15

how do I prove that's the right nurse and find her and I

16

thought it might be the medical assistant but wasn't sure and

17

I thought, would she have an independent memory of this

18

event?

19

and I say Sarah you're on maternity leave and you've been out

20

for four or five weeks, have you ever talked to Dr. Bryan

21

about this?

You remember better than

So I thought, okay, I'm defending Dr. Bryan, they're
First of all,

So I get hold of Sarah and it wasn't that long ago,

22

No, I haven't.

23

And I send records, do you remember this person?

24

No independent memory but these records I've looked through

25

and I thought she was very credible on this issue.

I said
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1

Sarah, first of all, does this sound like you and that's what

2

I thought was kind of cute, she said, I'm a picker, that's

3

me, I say the man and I'm the assistant.

4

in, yeah, that's me.

They even look kind of familiar.

5

what else can I say?

There's no charting, I admit there's no

6

charting but I say, Sarah, not only for Dr. Bryan but for Dr.

7

Madsen, you've worked for seven years as McKay Dee and other

8

places.

9

seen a lot shoulders, you know how they come in swollen.

10

you think you would have an independent memory though if

11

someone were to say, and then I repeated everything that was

12

claimed to have been said, a swollen arm that now Dr. Schmitz

13

is saying is twice as big and she said, I sure think I'd

14

remember that.

I think she tied
Then

Now you've worked there for four years plus, you've
Do

15

Have you ever had that?

16

No.

17

Do you think you'd recall that sort of an event?

18

I do.

19

Well, I think that's credible because I think it

20
21

gives support.
And wives are wonderful, they're supportive.

Mary

22

is wonderful.

She's supportive of her husband, but in

23

fairness that's why I take depositions under oath.

24

what do you remember, Mary, about the 28th, what are you

25

memories independent, you know, from your husband's?

So I say,

And I
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1

read that as part of what was involved and the comment there

2

was, basically November 28 she says, Well, I know that John

3

told them about the swelling and the raised, the swelling of

4 I the arm and the raised, and that he was in pain and I
5

remember Dr. Bryan essentially saying that the arm was

6

healing well and that's all I remember.

7

at the time - and we read that to you as I was impeaching her

8

or commenting that at the time of the trial, of her testimony

9

on the stand.

10

So that's what I get

And so again, wives are wonderful but I think

that that's what the testimony was under oath.

11

And let me just move onto another instruction if I

12

could.

What is the standard of care of a physician?

This is

13

an important Instruction No. 21.

14

it says basically, the law does not require a physician

15

exercise the highest degree of care but ordinary care under

16

the same circumstances.

17

Common things happen commonly.

18

If I'm going to be held responsible for not diagnosing

19

something, I sure hope it's something that the guy

20

criticizing me has at least seen in their practice and sent

21

someone to test for.

22

never sent anyone to test.

23

You've heard all the testimony except for, of course, Dr.

24

Schmitz who says, oh, this happens two to ten percent of the

25

time which I don't think is at all credible.

The law does not require -

And so, again, why is it important?
Rare things happen rarely.

But Dr. Serfustini had never seen it,
Dr. Vanderhooft has seen one.

And you've
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1

heard from even Dr. Serfustini on that issue.

2

With regard to Instruction No. 24, I think is
It says, X'A physician who

3

really an important one.

4

undertakes to treat a patient does not guarantee that no

5

complication will occur or that no adverse results will be

6

experienced because of the treatment.

7

complication or adverse result occurs does not by itself

8

imply or prove that the physician was negligent."

9

The fact that a

Remember Dr. Schmitz, I said right on the stand, I

10

said, the fact that Mr. Lyon got a clot, you're not saying

11

that's the fault of the physician?

12

Absolutely not.

13

Dr. Serfustini said, Oh no, this happens, this is

14

not as a result of fault or neglect.

15

decide, is this a complication a bad thing that can happen to

16

a good person like Mr. Lyon or is this one by negligence or

17

malpractice?

18

those conclusions.

19

Again, you need to

I think you've heard enough evidence to come to

Instruction No. 22 says the only way you can know

20

the standard of care is by an expert witness properly trained

21

and what they're basically saying is you compare apples with

22

apples.

23

doctor. And are basically saying so who was here?

24

Dr. Vanderhooft and Dr. Serfustini are the orthopedists

An orthopedic shouldn't be compared with an eye

25 I talking about standard of care.

Dr. Bryan,

(Inaudible) I'm a fact
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1 j witness, I'm a treater, I'm not a standard of care person.
2
3
4

Instruction No. 23 is the specialist is not to be
compared with the generalist and that's the same thing.
Instruction No. 25, the plaintiff has the burden of

5

proving that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate

6

cause of his injury.

7

asked, was there negligence and was it the cause of harm?

8

There's two questions.

9

negligence is found on the part of Dr. Bryan, if you

As a juror, on the verdict form you're

If you - even if it's negligence,

10

determine that that wasn't the cause of the injury, you could

11

say yes negligent and no causation and Dr. Bryan still wins

12

because the law requires negligence and causation.

13

parked at a red light and be intoxicated but if someone comes

14

behind me and slams into my car as I'm legally parked at the

15

red light, I shouldn't be intoxicated but it's not the cause

16

of being rear-ended.

17

other words, causation.

18

I can be

That's kind of a poor analogy but in

With regard to another instruction on expert

19

witnesses, "If you should conclude that the reasons given in

20

support of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions

21

are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the

22

opinion entirely."'

23

Instruction 16, you can compare relative

24

qualifications and credibility of experts, the facts and the

25

matters on which the opinions are based.

And again, that
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1

goes back to the foundation,

2

I was a little bit worried about bringing Dr.

3

Vanderhooft in because after I heard about him and he was so

4

recommended, I met him.

5

never called anyone to court that's got a beard or long hair.

6

I'm pretty conservative.

7

whole practice because I think jurors are kind of

8

conservative in Utah and I'm conservative.

9

bit terrified, how would you folks react to this gentleman?

10

I saw him as he appeared this morning and he wasn't dressed

11

in a suit like Mr. Savage and I and I thought, wow, and yet,

12

I was struck from the time I met this gentleman as a man of

13

absolute brilliance and integrity and he was a trench-line

14

practitioner.

15

his opinions are credible.

16

though, I brought in someone that looked a little unusual.

17

But I think you can look at the quality of his testimony, his

18

education and his heart.

19

He had hair down to here.

I've never dared grow a beard in my

He's in the trenches, he sees

This is a zebra.

I have

So I was a little

this and I think

I did something I've never done

But I thought that one thing Dr.

20

Vanderhooft found as we noted at trial that I hadn't even

21

seen, is he said Dave, there's things that don't fit in the

22

claim.

23

report.

24

other and that's that I think is important to talk about a

25

little bit.

He said he'd reviewed Dr. Schmitz' deposition and his
He never testified this arm was twice as big as the

Dr. Schmitz at the time said - I promise 129

1

aren't you glad - by the way, the big boards can't go back

2

with you, so I felt free to mark them all up

3

going to go in the garbage after anyway.

4

small one but not the big ones.

5

buried in the record but that's why it's my last chance to

6

remind you from the big ones and court clerks never want to

7

save all this big stuff.

8

now Schmitz' office visit of December 2 and you've seen this

9

before but again, he's talking about the shortness of breath

A

cause they're

You'll have little

You can find them all,

You don't get these.

But this is

10

is what's the chief complaint and brings him in.

That's what

11

he's really treating.

12

diagnose the problem now, the shortness of breath, not just a

13

swollen arm.

14

we get to the back and his first comment about muscular

15

skeletal is the left arm pain, is swelling, severity is

16

moderate, duration three days.

17

it's moderate.

Now, he's got a huge thing to help him

So he does - that's moderately severe.

Well,

We've talked about this but

And then he talks about three plus and edema.

18
19

Now Dr. Serfustini, although this is now a family

20

practice and this three plus is someone who doesn't see

21

normal post operative swelling, is saying, well (inaudible)

22

three plus and since it's now brawny in the estimation of a

23

family practice doctor, I'm interpreting that that it's been

24

there since the 28th.

25

Well, Dr. Vanderhooft said, no, this can occur
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1

almost overnight, within a few days, but he said what is even

2

more significant is he said that the swelling is in the

3

shoulder region, it's not in the whole arm.

4

that's clearly documented here but he said that's also

5

consistent with the fact that all of the downstream hospital

6

records at McKay Dee on December 2, there's no nurses notes,

7

there's no complaints or problems with regard to this arm

8

being twice the size of the other one.

9

important I think that Dr. Vanderhooft says, Well, this is

And he said,

In fact, it's very

10

the most important nobe to me, Dave, this is Sophey's note,

11

you make the notes as you're talking to the patient and then

12

you dictate them and you've seen the dictated note but this

13

is Sophey's handwritten note, this is a 57-year old - see how

14

this goes?

15

white male.

16

from the lips usually of the person and they do their

17

physical examination on what they call initial orders and

18

progress notes, December 2 of

19

later to transcribe it.

20

Sophey?

21

gets to his physical examination.

22

He's examining the abdomen.

23

Extremities, mild left arm swelling.

24

a hospitalist, not a family practice doctor who doesn't see

25

critically ill people.

Sophey's note.

This is a pleasant 57-year old

What happens is they jot some notes as they fall

A

05.

And then they have time

So what does he say there, Dr.

57-year old and he talks about him.

But then he

Abdomen is soft.

Okay.

That's important to look at.
I would suggest this is

This man is trying to document the
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1

symptoms, what is the conditoin and he says the left, mild

2

left arm swelling.

3

I would suggest that the whole case that's being

4

presented is since we've knocked the other three legs out

5

from underneath them, is whether the swelling along should

6

have clued in Dr. Bryan.

7

on the swelling.

8

says, this is probably the most important note in the chart.

9

Why haven't you got that, Epperson? And I'm going okay, we'll

Well, there's huge factual disputes

And this is - that's why Dr. Vanderhooft

10

throw it in and so that's it and I added it and blew it up

11

overnight.

12

with what Dr. Vanderhooft said and that is, the fact that if

13

you're going to get blockage and it's been long-term you're

14

often going to see a fever. You're going to see occluded and

15

you're going to see the whole arm swollen.

16

notes don't suggest and, in fact, just the opposite, that

17

it's not.

18

talked about.

19

swelling.

20

what did all that mean?

21

context.

22

sudden I'm thinking, okay, the best picture to me is that

23

this gentleman presented to Dr. Bryan, he said I do have

24

swelling and I've got a couple of lumps.

25

as, is not documented.

But I think that's huge because that's consistent

He said, Schmitz

Dr. Bryan is able to do all of his tests that we
And now we have Dr. Sophey saying, mild

Yeah, there's some swelling up in the shoulder but
I think Dr. Vanderhooft put it in

He said, this is a more acute onset.

So all of a

But the rest as far
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1

And then I think there was likely a progression

2

within the three days fits, he looks worse because he

3

certainly didn't have an arm twice as big as the other arm

4

when Sarah saw him or Dr. Bryan and he certainly didn't have

5

an arm that day when Dr. Sophey saw him.

6

There's so much more I could cover but I'm not

7

going to - you need to deliberate.

But again, as a defense

8

lawyer defending Dr. Bryan, on the issue of damages, I need

9

to talk about damages quickly.

Again, it's rare that I don't

10

have a special damages that are provable.

11

There's no claim that the medical expenses were out-of-pocket

12

and so the only thing is the M pain and suffering" or if Dr.

13

Bryan caused through negligence his residual problems.

14

again, as a defense lawyer, what do I try to do?

15 j okay, what records preexist?

He's retired.

So

I try to

Are some of these conditions

16 I preexisting and I see some things that just jump out at me
17

and I'm not trying to make a huge deal of them but I think as

18

a finder of fact you need to consider them if you ever get to

19

damages which you don't if you don't find fault or causation.

20

But assuming you get there, to damages, then you've got to

21

try to weigh out, what's preexisting?

22

defense lawyer is to show you what's there.

23

probably spent more time than I needed to but when you see we

24

get a $450,000 (inaudible) allegation, I've got to bring this

25

to your attention.

And then, my role as a
So that's why I
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1

Okay, what's your history?

Neck disc removal, etc.

2

and Dr. Bryan, we have in the records that we can go back to,

3

we have notes from exhibit - oh, we have the following

4

exhibits I'll just reference.

5

where he gets crashed in a motorcycle accident.

6

sympathetic to that because I had the misfortune of the same

7

thing.

8

In 1987 University of Utah. This is the one that Dr. Bryan

9

referenced where the University of Utah, they worked him up

10

for all of his complains and problems of hands and numbness

11

and finally the doctors there say, it's difficult to be

12

certain what's going on with this gentleman, but most of the

13

symptoms point to a possible cervical neck spontalitic

14

reticulopathy.

15

Exhibit 12, Owen Higgs for right tennis elbow.

16

lot of problems other side but then No. 12 is December 18 of

17

2000, Tibbetts removed a disc from the neck and they're

18

talking about thoracic outlet syndrome, at least looking for

19

it.

20

arm.

21

them that talks about ulnar nerve and hand and all that

22

preexists.

23

addition to everything else, in fact it's incredible to me

24

the older trained orthopedists, Dr. Bryan is still doing all

25

of these procedures and well.

I

We have Exhibit 9 is 1965

Not quite as bad luckily.

I'm

Then, and what resulted.

Then I've got some records in here for
He's got a

That's the radiation from neck or other places into the
I showed you the nerve conduction studies, three of

So Dr. Bryan who does a lot of spine surgery in

I could rarely get us someone
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1

here on the stand to say, tell me about spine surgery and how

2

that relates to potential symptomology in the arm and

3

shoulder in addition to a clot.

4

things you need to take into account, is that there's some

5

potential relationships.

6

that but, I think there was a deliberate effort in trial to

7

downplay the pain he had in his shoulder, left shoulder on

8

presentation to Dr. Bryan and that's why the very best

9

evidence are those records that a patient generates before a

But this is the sort of

I'm not going to waste more time on

10

lawsuit; left shoulder, the pain, this is chief complaint,

11

talks about shoulder, 98; talks about level of pain, 6;

12

frequency of pain, 10; etc.

13

me a little when I lifted and he had to almost talk me into

14

the surgery.

15

And yet it's like, Oh, it hurt

I think you can evaluate that.

What about damage? There's a suggestion, Well gee,

16

does this affect his lungs?

17

He's been 10 years on a C-pap machine.

18

pack history of smoking.

19

diesel fumes.

20

so I look at the records and we finally get a sporomatry in

21

April of 2009 and the sporomatry says no, he's at 115 percent

22

of expected and there's a claim, and I appreciated the

23

conception that there is no permanent lung damage claim in

24 I this case.

We say no, he's had sleep apnea.
He's got a 10-year

He's been a railroad working around

Is that trying to be blamed on Dr. Bryan?

And

But there's the pain and inconvenience and the

25 | potential in between,
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1

On that issue I just want to point out that we have

2

the records of Dr. Schmitz and he has six various visits or

3

so after the patient was recovering from this on December 2

4

and they're all in there and if you look through those notes

5

you will see he talks about a bump on his foot, he talks

6

about respiratory illnesses.

7

see if there's complaint of arm pain.

8

pain and I think that's why counsel has it in his exhibit,

9

deal with the 6-month later, let's do another study to see

10

again what the veins looks like in the arm and the request

11

says - for pain, look at it.

12

those visits that reference pain to the arm and he admitted,

13

Well, I don't even tell Mary about the pain, I didn't tell

14

Mary about the pain in the arm.

15

big element of their claim because there's no permanent lung

16

damage.

17

the type described?

You go through those six and
The only reference to

There's nothing else in all of

But that's now the element,

And again, does that translate to damage?

18

Ahhh, of

I would suggest not.

Anyway, I'm going to cut it off now and just

19

basically conclude by thanking you so much for your service.

20

Trials are exhausting for jurors but especially for lawyers.

21

I'm tired.

22

there with a 2-week old, 3-week old broken ribs but he's done

23

it, again, not for sympathy but he's looked a little

24

discountenanced.

25

appreciate his integrity.

I know Dr. Bryan is tired.

I don't know he sat

There's a reason for it, in part, and I
I think he showed ultimate
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1

integrity, even though he had those notes to say Mr. Lyon is

2

100 percent correct, I did not tell him about pulmonary

3

embolus.

4

Dr. Bryan not to admit something like that where he has a

5

note in his chart that could help support he did.

6

suggest that's integrity and I suspect he'll no longer keep a

7

generic chart as he did because this is the one in - I don't

8

know, one in hundred patients that it didn't apply to.

9

applies to everybody else.

He didn't have to do that.

I could no more tell

It

I think that is a little

10

embarrassing.

11

fraudulent?

12

Absolutely not I'd suggest and you can weigh that

13

credibility.

14

I would

But was it deceitful? Was it dishonest? Was it
Are these late records he's prepared?

Thank you so much for your service.

We appreciate

15

it and may I just finish with again referring back to Lady

16

Justice?

17

side.

18

criminal penalties.

19

is on her side is also to protect those who have been

20

wrongfully accused.

Lady Justice is also depicted with a sword on her

It's often suggested that that's for the execution of
But I've also like to believe that sword

Thank you.

21

THE COURT:

22

Ladies and gentlemen, we've been at this an hour

23

Thank you, Mr. Epperson.

and a half, anyone be interest in a 5-minute bathroom break?

24

MR. SAVAGE:

25

That's about how long I'm going to

take.

I
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1

THE COURT:

Okay, very well.

2

MR. SAVAGE:

Go ahead please.

I think defense is getting pretty

3

desperate when they start having to go preexisting conditions

4

are now the cause of John's terrible lung pain.

5

talking a motorcycle accident, 1965; cervical operation in

6

1987.

7

ulnar nerve and hand sometime, I don't even know when; that

8

he has sleep apnea.

9

terrible pain in his chest and couldn't sleep without sitting

John said he had no problems after that.

They're

That he had

That maybe could explain why he had

10

up for five months.

There is nothing to tie any of these

11

together other than the desperation of not having a good,

12

solid case to establish what he really is saying, and that is

13

that John and Mary Lyon are lying.

14

out of notes.

15

do.

16

not John had a swollen arm on November 28.

He takes bits and pieces

He weaves them as a very capable lawyer could

When all is said and done, it gets back to whether or

17

Plaintiff does has the burden of proving by a

18

preponderance of the evidence and what does he have the

19

burden of proving?

20

the experts, both Dr. Vanderhooft and Dr. Serfustim agree

21

that Dr. Bryan was negligent if John Lyon had a very swollen

22

arm on November 28.

23

because Dr. Bryan didn't write it down in his notes.

24
25

That Dr. Bryan was negligent.

Both of

So it gets back to is John a lair

I've gone through the reasons why I think the
testimony is consistent.

I'm still stunned at the fact that
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1

there are notes that Dr. Bryan has that are just phony, just

2

paper in his file.

3

word liars, not called them liars, but this is what this is

4

all about.

5

or he didn't.

6

I'm sure that counsel has not used the

John either had a swollen arm as he says he did

Counsel seems to hold great reliance on John Lyon's

7

notes that he took.

Keep in mind again, these are notes.

I

8

don't know how you take notes, but I don't write everything

9

down when I write a note.

We have court reporters, used to

10

have court reporters, now we electronically record, court

11

reporters type if we need it, that's an effort to have

12

complete notes.

The rest of us take down notes and what is

13

important here?

Counsel seems to think it's really important

14

that John said in his deposition or maybe on the stand here

15 I that his recollection is his hand was numb on the 28th of
16

November and in here he said in Mary's presence I said it

17

wasn't.

18

why he would write down if he meant wasn't, why he would put,

19

this was right in my wife's presence, I said I didn't have

20

this; in my wife's presence I didn't have other thing I

21

guess.

22

Well, that kind of strikes me as odd anyway as to

But what is important here?

We return on November

23

20 to remove the stitches, the nurse arrives.

I told her

24

with Mary present, my hand hasn't been going numb.

25

what counsel thinks is somehow proving John Lyon is a liar

That's
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1 I because there's inconsistent - he calls it his Perry Mason
2

moment.

3

Mason moment he's had a very mild career.

4

every case we have there's inconsistencies and so what?

5

Vanderhooft said, it doesn't matter, it's irrelevant.

6

Counsel says it's a leg of a stool or something.

7

My goodness.

If that the best he can do for a Perry

What is in the stool?

The simple fact is
Dr.

It isn't.

On this leg of this stool, I

8

told her with Mary present, my hand hadn't been going numb

9

although my left arm was very swollen, there were lumps in

10

it.

Counsel left out the part with the lumps, that

11

corroborates what John said on the stand.

12

that's also irrelevant for diagnostic reasons.

13

in this note he took that it was very swollen and had lumps

14

in it.

15

doctor arrived, he asked how I was, I told him the same as I

16

said to his nurse, my hand wasn't going numb although my arm

17

was very swollen with lumps.

18

notes about his patient saying his arm was very swollen with

19

lumps in it.

20

consistent with Mary's deposition.

The doctors say
But he said

She removed the stitches, Dr. Bryan came in, the

There's nothing in Dr. Bryan's

That's consistent with what John said and it's

21

Now, we read her testimony while she was on the

22

stand, I asked her in redirect were you nervous then, was

23

your mind going blank?

24

this deposition says.

25

guess that Mary Lyon has changed her story since the

And she said, yes, and that's what
He's somehow trying to indicate I
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1

deposition.

She hasn't.

This is her answer, this is the

2

same dayf talking about the 28th, "This" the 28th "is the day

3

that John complained to him about the swollenness and counsel

4

interrupt and she "and the...

5

My question first is, were you present?

6

Yes, I was.

7 !

What do you remember about that day?

8

I am so blank.

9

transcript.

That's not a blank in the

It's spell out, B-L-A-N-K.

I am so blank.

She

10

meant she was having trouble remembering under the stress of

11

that deposition.

12

them about the swelling and the raised..."

13

that could have been lumps, could have been describing the

14

swelling.

15

he was in pain."

16

said he was in pain.

17

Maybe he didn't put that in his note but there is

18

corroboration that he was in pain.

19

that is a Perry Mason moment and I submit it's a desperation

20

to try to suggest that it is.

21

She goes on to say, "I know that John told
I submit that

"The swelling of the arm and the raised...and that
Consistent, she said he was in pain.

John

John doesn't talk about pain much.

This is not something

I believe both of the two experts have said lumps

22

in the arm doesn't matter but John is consistent in reporting

23

it.

24

doesn't say in his note he's in pain.

25

under oath he was in pain, she was rubbing his arm and

Counsel says that there's some inconsistencies, John
Did Mary testify again
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1

putting heat on it and she's afraid that that caused it to

2

get worse and she broke up.

3

pain.

4
5
6

John is a tough guy, but he's in

The Voltaren versus the Ibuprofen, I don't know
where all these have gone - maybe put these over here.
Counsel has created another red herring by one choice of

7

words that this was a bigger gun.

It's not the point,

8

whether a bigger gun, same gun or even a smaller gun.

9

point is, on the 2 8th of November when everything that was

The

10

said was so important, Dr. Bryan did not say anything about

11

pain as well as not saying anything about swelling and this

12

is the part about Voltaren that's important, "I'm going to

13

put him on some Voltaren to see if this will help more than

14

Ibuprofen."

15

Voltaren would help more, that's because John was in pain and

I would submit that if he wanted to see if

16 i the Ibuprofen wasn't working well enough.

Counsel would have

17

you believe that no, he wasn't in pain, he's now lying when

18

he says he was in pain because Voltaren is not a bigger gun

19

that Ibuprofen.

20

help more and it's a pain medication, more than the Ibuprofen

21

was helping.

22

The notes says he wanted to see if it would

He said, Boy, he was really happy with Dr.

23

Serfustini and of course I was.

He said that Dr. Serfustini

24

had never seen this happen before and he thought boy, that

25

was just great, a man with his stellar career.

I think we
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1

have beat that red herring out of the water.

2

condition but every doctor has said, you learn about it in

3

medical school. You look for it in every patient and frankly,

4

it doesn't matter whether or not he had surgery.

5

comes in with a possible blood clot even in a rare location,

6

all of the doctors have said you should check it out.

7

It is a rare

If a guy

I asked Dr. Vanderhooft, I also liked Dr.

8

Vanderhooft and he said it would be negligent, it would be a

9

breach of the standard of care in this medical community to

10

not check that arm out more if it was the same as it was on

11

December 2.

12

arm, forget about it.

13

back again, was John's arm swollen?

14

asked him and Dr. Serfustini did the numbness matter?

15

that's irrelevant.

16

irrelevant.

17

his note said it was very swollen.

18

she was rubbing it for days before he saw the doctor.

19

a very swollen arm and for whatever reason, Dr. Bryan missed

20

it, didn't listen to his patient.

21

thinking about the last patient or the 30 or 50 he was seeing

22

that day.

23

patient.

24

reform.

He didn't say, no, it was rare, it was in the
A rarity is a red herring.

I asked him, I think I

Do the lumps matter?

What's relevant?

It gets

No,

No, that's

Was his arm swollen?

John in

Mary says it was swollen,
He had

I don't know if he was

I don't know if he was thinking about the next
I don't know if he's thinking about health care
But he did not listen to his patient, did not check

25 I that arm out and it was very swollen at that time, it had to
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1

be, it was swollen before and Dr. Schmitz testified that Mr,

2

Lyon told him it was swollen when he went and saw Dr.

3

Serfustini (sic).

4

Now, again, counsel picks and chooses and just

5

finds a little bit and piece in the notes and he says, Oh

6

look, Dr. Schmitz didn't say his arm was twice as big in his

7

notes.

8

penalty of perjury?

9

man's arm was twice as big as his right arm.

How about when you stand up and swear under oath with
He sat there on that stand and said that
He didn't say -

10

I don't think he was even asked about these other things,

11

about elbow and shoulder and he didn't say the wound around

12

the shoulder from the surgery was swollen.

13

Schmitz.

You saw Dr.

He said that his arm was swollen and it was twice

14 I as big.
15

Now counsel said, Well gee, on the same day Dr.

16

Sophey wrote a note saying it wasn't very swollen, mild I

17

think.

Where is Dr. Sophey?

If that was so darned important

18 I to them, why not call Dr. Sophey and ask him under oath what
19

he meant by that note?

He didn't come in here.

We just have

20

a note and Mr. Epperson has carefully filtered what went to

21

Dr. Vanderhooft.

22

of care was breached based upon the medical records I looked

23

at.

24

know about that?

No.

Did you know this is testimony under

25

oath about this?

No.

Well if all that was true, what would

Dr. Vanderhooft, I don't think the standard

So I asked him did you know about this?

No.

Did you
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1

your opinion be?

2

sending him for treatment.

3

Well, breach of standard of care for not

Dr. Schmitz explained his notes.

Explaining the

4

notes is much more important than just taking one part of a

5

note out of context that some doctor took down.

6

has seen lots of people too in a hospital.

7

seen lots of people, sworn testimony.

8

with is pick and choose on a couple of statements and some

9

notes, pick and choose on what was said in deposition, lady,

Dr. Sophey

Dr. Schmitz has

Best they can come up

10

sweet lady, couldn't get her mind together at the time; and a

11

note John Lyon wrote where he didn't say he was in pain in

12

his note.

13

to have decided by now for sure, John Lyon is a tough guy and

14

he puts up with a lot of pain.

15

note.

16

pain and that pain was caused by the blood clot.

17

very carefully said that, Boy, they said that the blood clot,

18

the first clot, the start of the clot that came from the

19

surgery, is a complication and that's true.

20

claiming that the fact it started a clot in his arm is caused

21

by the surgery or caused by anything Dr. Bryan did wrong.

22

It's rare, but still, it's not caused by anything Dr. Bryan

23

did wrong.

24

formed, it was there for three days or so before Mr. Lyon

25

went to see Dr. Bryan, his wife was trying to get him to go

If there's anything you ought to know, you ought

And he didn't put it in that

Mary said he had pain. He says now under oath he had
Counsel

We're not

We're here because regardless of why that clot
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1

to the doctor.

She was rubbing it, putting heat on it.

2

now know that that swelling was definitely caused by the

3

clot.

4

explanation for why his arm was swollen.

We

There's no question, there's no other offer of any

5

He had it.

We're not here because the clot first started

6

because of the surgery.

It doesn't matter to me why it

7

started.

8

stop this from progressing, had a chance to stop this from

9

getting worse, had a chance to stop this from slipping part

What matters to me is that a doctor had a chance to

10

of the clot out and going to Mr. Lyon's lung, that it was

11

swollen, he didn't look at it, John told him.

12

John Lyon, Dr. Bryan was negligent.

13

John Lyon, said the notes are important but if he said these

14

things and that was the presentation, Dr. Bryan was

15

negligent.

16

the numbness, forget about it, just the swollen arm, it's

17

negligent not to treat it.

18

If you believe

Dr. Serfustini believed

Dr. Vanderhooft said that presented, forget about

One last little thing.

I feel strongly about this

19

and I don't want that to develop any negative feelings to

20

you.

21

hope you don't hold that against John.

22

It's important to John. It's important to Dr. Bryan.

23

isn't that important to Dr. Bryan.

24

more than anything.

25

even today can accept the possibility that he was so

I apologize if some of my emotion came through and I
This is important.
Money

I think it's his pride

He's a very proud man, I don't think he
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1

negligent on that day, running from patient to patient.

I

2

think you're in a position, you've seen all the evidence I

3

think you're in a position to decide that issue.

4

was negligent.

5

that you will find a just and fair reward for John.

6

and I agree, we're not here for sympathy or anger.

7

here for justice and I'm very happy to submit this into your

8

hands at this time. Zind I've appreciated your time and

9

attention to this lengthy argument of counsel.

I submit he

It's caused John damage and grief and I hope
Counsel
We are

God speed.

10

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Savage.

11

Mr. Domico, you have served during this trial as an

12

alternate juror.

We asked that you serve just in case one of

13

the other jurors became ill or otherwise unable to serve.

14 I We've now at a point in the trial where the jury must
15

deliberate and I must at this time suspend your service.

16

Would you kindly leave your telephone number with the clerk

17 I just in case there was a situation where we had to bring you
18

back?

Otherwise, I'll have the clerk give you a call and let

19

you know after we do have a verdict, that your services are

20

now excused.

21

willingness to serve.

22

MR. SAVAGE:

Okay?

But thank you so very much for your

I think also it's appropriate that

23

even though he's suspended, that he not talk to anybody about

24

the case.

25

THE COURT:

I agree with that.

For the same reason
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that I have repeated throughout the trial, that's to just
preserve your objectivity in this case.

It's remote that

you'll need to come back but I think that's a point well
taken.

So would you just continue to remove yourself from

everybody until the clerk gives you a call and tells you that
you're excused?

Thank you so much for your service.

I know

this might be a little bit deflating having invested so much
time and effort in this case and now to be pointed toward the
door, but it's just the way the system works.
very much for your service.
All right.

Thank you so

You may leave now.

Would you swear the bailiff please?

(Whereupon the bailiff was sworn)
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm now going to

submit this case to you for your decision.
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).
THE COURT:

Let me just express to Mr. and Mrs.

Lyon and Dr. Bryan, it's been a pleasure to have you in my
courtroom this week.

Let me just indicate to you that I

don't know what this jury is going to do but I would like
both sides to know that your lawyers in this case have been
exemplary.

I think the legal representation provided by your

attorneys have exemplified what I think is the very best of
our legal profession.

They had been well prepared and

professional and have, I thought, done a magnificent job of
presenting well, both sides.
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1

With that, I'm going to just indicate that you're

2

welcome to leave the courtroom.

What I do ask is if you want

3

to go get something to eat of leave, that you leave a phone

4

number, a cell phone so that we can immediately reach you in

5

case I need to ask you questions.

6

jurors ask questions and it is my practice and I think a

7

proper practice that before I communicate with that jury at

8

all, that I speak with the lawyers about what the question is

9

and they have an opportunity to review what my response will

It's not uncommon to have

10

be to the jury.

And of course at such time a they have

11

reached a verdict, I don't want to detain them unnecessarily

12

in the jury room, but I'd like to be able as soon as

13

possible, bring them in and receive their verdict.

14

MR. SAVAGE:

(inaudible).

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. EPPERSON:

Great.
May I just thank you on behalf of

17

Dr. Bryan the Court and your very attentive staff and bailiff

18

have been wonderfully helpful and very capable and thank you

19

for your courtesy.

20

MR. SAVAGE:

21

THE COURT:

22

I join in that.
Thank you very much.

recess then until the jury returns.

23

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

24

THE COURT:

25

All right, we'll

(Inaudible) show them a menu and take

orders and in that event, I'll communicate with you so you
14 9

1

can at least try to have a feel for what's happening.

2
3

MR. SAVAGE:

In my experience it means they'll take

at least an hour longer so I would hold off (inaudible).

4

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

5

THE COURT:

The record may show that the jury has

6

returned to the courtroom.

7

you have reached a verdict, is this true?

8

JURY FOREPERSON:

9

THE COURT:

It is.

And are you the foreperson?

10

JURY FOREPERSON:

11

THE COURT:

Yes.

May I have your verdict please?

12

you.

13

verdict for the record.

14

The bailiff has informed me that

Thank

It appears that there is a verdict and I will read the

The first question given to the jury is considering

15

all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Donald

16

Bryan M.D., negligent?

The answer is yes.

17

The next question is, if your answer to question

18

number 1 is yes, was the negligence the proximate cause of

19

injury or damages to the plaintiff?

And the answer is no.

20

Would either side like to have the jury polled?

21

MR. EPPERSON:

22

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor, to both questions.

All right.

As I read your name would

23

you respond by just saying yes or no and this will be to

24

question number 1. And again question number 1 is whether

25

there was negligence in this case.
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1

Vickie Hathaway?

2

JUROR HATHAWAY: Yes.

3 I

THE COURT: Kathryn Crane?

4

JUROR CRANE: Yes.

5

THE COURT: Joshua Turnbow?

6

JUROR TURNBOW: Yes.

7

THE COURT: Emma Roller?

8

JUROR ROLLER: Yes.

9

THE COURT: Ethel Hansen?

10

JUROR HANSEN: No.

11

THE COURT: Janet Engelke?

12

Excuse me if I

mispronounce.

13

JUROR ENGELRE: Yes.

14 I

THE COURT: Clara Puffer?

15

JUROR PUFFER: Yes.

16 I

THE COURT: Noreen Francis?

17

JUROR FRANCIS: No.

18

THE COURT: Okay, we have a [inaudible] on question

19
20

number 1.
All right, with respect to question number 2 and

21

that question again is if your answer to question 1 is yes,

22

was such negligence the proximate cause of any injury or

23

damages to the plaintiff?

24

Vickie Hathaway, is this your verdict?

25

JUROR HATHAWAY: No.
151

1

THE COURT: Kathryn Crane, is this your verdict?

2

JUROR CRANE: No.

3

THE COURT: Joshua Turnbow, is this your verdict?

4

JUROR TURNBOW: No.

5

THE COURT: Emma Roller?

6

JUROR ROLLER: No.

7

THE COURT: Ethel Hansen?

8

JUROR HANSEN: No.

9

THE COURT: Janet Engelke?

10

JUROR ENGELKE: Engelke.

11

THE COURT: Engelke.

12

JUROR ENGELKE: No.

13

THE COURT: Clara Puffer?

14

JUROR PUFFER: No.

15

THE COURT: Noreen Francis?

16

JUROR FRANCIS: No.

17

THE COURT:

18

right or did —

19
20

MR. SAVAGE:

THE COURT:

22

MR. SAVAGE:

24
25

I don't know.

The way I heard it, the

answer —

21

23

I'm wondering, did I ask the question

They were all consistent.
Yeah.

But I thought you asked if it

was their verdict and the verdict I thought was no.
THE COURT:

Did you misunderstand my question?

Let

me rephrase the question and that may have been my fault and
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1

not yours.

Again, the question is, if your answer to

2

question 1 is yes, was the negligence the proximate cause of

3

any injury or damages to the plaintiff and the verdict form

4

says no.

5

you say yes.

6

with the answer, then say no.

My question is, is this your verdict and if it is
If it's not your verdict or you don't agree

7

Vickie Hathaway, is this your verdict?

8

JUROR HATHAWAY: Yes.

9

THE COURT: Kathryn Crane, is this your verdict?

10

JUROR CRANE: Yes.

11

THE COURT: Joshua Turnbow, is this your verdict?

12

JUROR TURNBOW: Yes.

13

THE COURT: Emma Roller, is this your verdict?

14

JUROR KOLLER: Yes.

15

THE COURT: Ethel Hansen?

16

JUROR HANSEN: Yes.

17

THE COURT: Janet, excuse me.

18

JUROR ENGELKE: That's okay.

19

THE COURT: Engelke? Excuse me.

20

JUROR ENGELKE: My answer is yes.

21

THE COURT: Clara Puffer, is this your verdict?

22

JUROR PUFFER: Yes.

23

THE COURT: Noreen Francis, is this your verdict?

24 I

JUROR FRANCIS: Yes.

25

THE COURT: All right, the polling indicates that
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their answers to the questions are consistent with the
verdict.
Ladies and gentlemen, this has been a long week for
you and I want to take this moment to express to you on
behalf of all of us in this room your sincere - our sincere
appreciation for your hard work and attention during this
case.

The admonition that I gave you earlier in the case,

not to discuss this case with anyone, no longer applies.
You're welcome to go home and talk to anyone about the case.
I'm sure that it's been a fascinating experience for you.

It

was for me.
If you like - and there's certainly no duty or
obligation on your part, you may hang around and talk to the
lawyers.

Sometimes they have questions.

Maybe they won't

have any questions, maybe they will but if you're tired or
you'd just as soon not answer questions, you can just follow
the bailiff out to the parking lot and he'll escort you to
your car.

It's still light but I'd feel more secure in

having you escort the women to their cars.
All right, again, thank you very much and you're
not discharged.

Thank you.

MR. EPPERSON: Thank you for your service
(Whereupon the trial was concluded)
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070903637 BRYAN,DONALD W

Members of the jury, we are about to begin the trial ot this case. You have heard some
details about this case during the process of jury selection. Before the trial begins, however,
there are certain instructions you should have to better understand what will be presented to you
and how you should conduct yourself during the trial.
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff. In this action the plaintiff is John
A. Lyon (patient). The party against whom the suit is brought is called the defendant. In this
action the defendant is Donald Bryan, M.D. (Orthopedic surgeon).
The Plaintiff claims that on November 15, 2005, Dr. Bryan performed surgery on Mr.
Lyon's left shoulder (rotator cuff) at McKay-Dee Hospital and that on November 28, 2005, Dr.
Bryan negligently failed to diagnose and treat blood clots in his arm, causing injury and damage.
The Defendant Dr. Bryan has denied that he was negligent in the medical care rendered to Mr.
Lyon and that his care was the cause of his alleged injury and damage.
By your verdict, you will decide disputed issues of fact. I will decide all questions of law

that arise during the trial. Before you retire to deliberate at the close of the case, I will instruct
you on the law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict.
Since you will be called upon to decide the facts of this case, you should give careful
attention to the testimony and evidence presented for your consideration, bearing in mind that I
will instruct you at the end of the trial concerning the manner in which you should determine the
credibility or "believability" of each witness and the weight to be given the testimony. During
the trial, however, you should keep an open mind and should not form or express any opinion
about the case one way or the other until you have heard all of the testimony and evidence, the
closing arguments of the lawyers, and my instructions to you on the law.
While the trial is in progress, you must not discuss the case in any manner among
yourselves or with anyone else, nor should you permit anyone to discuss it in your presence.
From time to time during the trial, I may be called upon to make rulings of law on
objections or motions made by the lawyers. It is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to
object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence that the lawyer believes is not
properly admissible. You should not be angry at a lawyer or the client because the lawyer has
made objections. You should not infer or conclude from any ruling or other comment I may
make that I have any opinion on the merits of the case favoring one side or the other. And if I
sustain an objection to a question that goes unanswered by the witness, you should not draw any
inference or conclusion from the question itself.
During the trial it may be necessary for me to confer with the lawyers out of your hearing
with regard to questions of law or procedure that require consideration by me. On some
occasions you may be excused from the courtroom for the same reason. I will try to limit these
interruptions as much as possible, but you should remember the importance of the matter you are
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here to determine, and should be patient even though the case may seem to go slowly.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ J
The case will proceed in the following order:
1.

The plaintiffs lawyer may make an opening statement outlining the case. The

defendant's lawyer may also make an opening statement outlining the case immediately after the
plaintiffs statement, or may defer making an opening statement until the conclusion of the
plaintiffs case. Neither party is required to make an opening statement. What is said in the
opening statement is not evidence, but is simply designed to provide you with an introduction to
the evidence the party making the statement intends to produce.
2.

The plaintiff will introduce evidence through testimony of witnesses and exhibits.

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, the defendant may introduce evidence. The defendant,
however, is not obliged to introduce any evidence or to call any witnesses. If the defendant
introduces evidence, the plaintiff may then introduce rebuttal evidence.
3.

I will instruct you on the law which you are to apply in reaching your verdict.

4.

The parties may present closing arguments to you as to what they believe the

evidence has shown and the inferences which they contend you should draw from the evidence.
What is said in a closing argument, just as what is said in an opening statement, is not evidence.
The arguments are designed to present to you the contentions of the parties based on the evidence
introduced. The plaintiff has the right to open and to close the argument.

OG

INSTRUCTION NO. &
The evidence in the case will consist of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, regardless
of who may have called them; all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have
introduced them; and all facts which may have been judicially noticed, and which I instruct you
to take as true for the purposes of this case.
Depositions may also be received in evidence. Depositions contain sworn testimony,
with the lawyer for each party being entitled to ask questions. Testimony provided in a
deposition may be read to you in open court or may be seen on a video monitor. Deposition
testimony is to be considered by you, subject to the same instructions which apply to witnesses
testifying in open court.
Statements and arguments of lawyers are not evidence in the case, unless made as an
admission or stipulation of fact. When the lawyers on both sides stipulate or agree to the
existence of a fact, you must, unless otherwise instructed, accept the stipulation as evidence, and
regard that fact as proved.
I may take judicial notice of certain facts. When I declare that I will take judicial notice
of some fact, you must accept that fact as true.
Any evidence as to which I sustain an objection, and any evidence I order to be stricken,
must be disregarded entirely.
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence, and must be
disregarded entirely.
Some evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only. When I instruct you that an item
of evidence has been admitted for a limited purpose, you must consider it only for that limited

purpose and for no other.
You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration of the
evidence, you are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. In other words, you are not
limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You are permitted to draw, from
the facts which you find have been proved, such reasonable inferences as you feel are justified in
light of your experience.

01< 'j j 4 i

INSTRUCTION NO.

3

You are to determine what witnesses to believe and what parts of their testimony you
believe. You also must determine what weight or value you place upon the testimony of the
various witnesses. In making these determinations, you might like to consider some or all of the
following:
1)

the demeanor and deportment of the witness in the courtroom;

2)

the witness' interest in the result of the trial;

3)

any tendency to favor or disfavor one side or the other;

4)

the probability or improbability of events having occurred the way the
witness describes the events;

5)

the ability of the witness to actually see or hear or otherwise perceive the
things described;

6)

the ability of the witness to now accurately recall the things the witness
observed;

7)

whether the witness is able to describe what he observed accurately and in a
form that you can understand;

8)

whether the witness made earlier statements or expressions that are
consistent or inconsistent with what is now being said;

9)

whether the witness speaks the truth or not.

But whatever tests you use, the value of a witness' testimony is for you to determine.

<, / o

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

Serious problems have been caused around the country by jurors using computer and
electronic communication technology. It's natural that we want to investigate a case, or to share
with others our thoughts about the trial, and it's easy to do so with the Internet and instant
communication devices or services, such as Blackberries, iPhones, Facebook, Twitter, and so on.
However, please understand that the rules of evidence and procedure have developed
over hundreds of years in order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the entire
system depends entirely on you, the jurors, reaching your decisions based on evidence presented to
you in court, and not on other sources of information. You violate your oath as jurors if you
conduct your own investigations or communicate about this trial with others.
Jurors have caused serious consequences for themselves and the courts by "Googling"
the parties, issues, or counsel; "Twittering" with friends about the trial; using Blackberries or
iPhones to gather or send information on cases; posting trial updates on Facebook pages; using
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, and so on. Even using something as seemingly
innocent as "Google Maps" can result in a mistrial.
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they
are discovered, they will be brought to my attention, and the entire case may have to be retried, at
substantial cost.
Violations may also result in substantial penalties for the juror.
So I must warn you again -• do not use your cell phone or computer to investigate or
discuss anything connected with this trial until it is completely finished. Do not use Internet
research of any kind, and advise me if you learn of any juror who has done so.

OG',34 3
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After the evidence has been heard and arguments and instructions are concluded, you
will retire to consider the evidence and arrive at your verdict. You will determine the facts from all
the testimony you hear and the other evidence that is received. You are the sole judges of the facts.
Neither I nor anyone else may invade your responsibility to act as judges of the facts.
On the other hand, and with equal emphasis, I instruct you that you are bound to accept
the rules of law that I give you whether you agree with them or not.

000344

INSTRUCTION NO. [Q
During this trial I will permit you to take notes Many courts do not permit note-taking
by jurors, and a word of caution is in order. There is always a tendency to attach undue importance
to matters which one has written down. Some testimony that is considered unimportant at the time
presented, and thus not written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the
evidence presented. Therefore, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and
you should not compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or
in evaluating the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence, and are by no means a
complete outline of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory
should be your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. ~7
You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. It is important that
you obey the following instructions with reference to the recesses of the court:
1. Do not discuss the case either among yourselves or with anyone else during the trial.
In fairness to the parties to this lawsuit, you should keep an open mind throughout the trial, reaching
your conclusion only during your final deliberations. Only after all the evidence is in and you have
heard the lawyers' summations and my instructions to you on the law, and only after an interchange
of views with each other may you reach your conclusion.
2. Do not permit any person to discuss the case in your presence. If anyone does so,
despite your telling him or her not to, report that fact to me as soon as you are able. You should not,
however, discuss with your fellow jurors either that fact, or any other fact that you feel necessary to
bring to my attention.
3. Though it is a normal human tendency to converse with other people, please do not
converse with any of the parties or their lawyers or any witness. By this, I mean not only do not
converse about the case, but do not converse at all, even to pass the time of day. In no other way
can all the parties be assured of the absolute impartiality they are entitled to expect from you as
jurors.
4. Do not do any research or make any investigation about the case on your own.
5. Finally, I instruct you again - do not make up your mind about what the verdict
should be until after you have gone to the jury room to decide the case and you and your fellow
jurors have discussed the evidence. Keep an open mind until then.
Now, we will begin by giving the lawyers for each side an opportunity to make their

INSTRUCTION NO. 7 A
Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your attention during this trial. I will now
explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and apply in deciding this case. When I have
finished, you will go to the jury room and begin your discussions, what we call your deliberations.
Please pay attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you. This is an extremely important
part of this trial.
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but must consider the
instructions as a whole. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their
relative importance. If a direction or an idea is stated more than once, or in varying ways, no
emphasis is intended and none must be inferred by you.
You will take these instructions with you into the jury room for further reference.

-14-

INSTRUCTION NO. 8
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as jurors,
to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what you personally believe the law is or ought to
be. Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use them. On the other hand, it is
your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for
that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion, and
honest deliberation.

-15-

INSTRUCTION NO. 9
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or
angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law, without
regard to sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public opinion.

-16-

INSTRUCTION NO. 10
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the witnesses,
and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted into
evidence.
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you
in arriving at your verdict.
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during trial.

-17-

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or another
in this case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict. It would be
improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot participate in
that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done if it made you think
that I preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over another, or that I
considered any piece of evidence more important than another.
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just
verdict based upon the facts and the evidence.

-18-

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right to
take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive to
testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses1
statements.

-19-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements inconsistent
with that witness' testimony given here in this case.
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the present
testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to determine.

-20-

INSTRUCTION NO. 14
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated by
other credible evidence.

-21-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling,
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long as it
is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any,
given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it deserves. If you
should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient education and
experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinions are not
sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion
entirely.

-22-

INSTRUCTION NO. 16
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you may
compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing this, you may
consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons for
each opinion and the facts and other matters on which such opinions are based.
The fact that an expert witness resides or pursues the profession in another state or
community should not affect the weight you give the witness' testimony. A party may rely upon
qualified experts from other states and countries in presenting evidence to the jury.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts
or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the facts sought to be proved.
For example, if the fact to be proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a witness testifies that
she saw Johnny take a bite of the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the fact. On the other hand, if
the witness testifies that she saw Johnny with cherries smeared on his face and an empty pie plate in
his hand, that is circumstantial evidence of the fact.

-24-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds, seems
to be of the greater weight, the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence
is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the
convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly, and honestly by you. If the
evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such
allegation has not been proved.

-25-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
A party seeking to prove a fact bears the burden of proof. In doing so, the party must prove
the truth of the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. Unless the evidence so preponderates
in support of that allegation of fact, you shall find that the allegation is not true.

-26-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20
In this case the plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent.
To return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that:
L

The defendant was negligent; and

2.

The defendant's negligence proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.

If you find in favor of the plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide the amount
of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.

-27-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21
In this case you must decide whether or not the defendant was negligent in the context of
what the law requires of physicians.
A physician is required to exercise the same degree of learning, care, skill and treatment
ordinarily possessed and used by other qualified physicians in good standing practicing in the same
medical field. The law does not require that a physician exercise the highest degree of care. It
requires the physician to exercise the degree of care that other qualified physicians would ordinarily
exercise under the same circumstances.
It is negligent for a physician not to exercise this degree of care.

-28-

000061

INSTRUCTION NO. 22
The only way you may properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence
presented during this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses and through other evidence
admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of care.
In deciding whether a physician properly fulfilled the physician's duties, you are not
permitted to use a standard derived from your own experience with physicians or any other standard
of your own.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23
The specialist is required to exercise the same degree of skill and care ordinarily used by
similar specialists under similar conditions. The conduct of a specialist is not compared with that of
the general practitioner.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24
A physician who undertakes to treat a patient does not guarantee that no complications will
occur or that no adverse results will be experienced because of the treatment. The fact that a
complication or adverse result occurs does not, by itself, imply or prove that the physician was
negligent.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the alleged negligence of the defendant was a
proximate cause of his injury.
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A proximate cause is
one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26
I will now instruct you about damages. The fact that I am instructing you concerning
damages is not to be taken as an indication that I either believe or do not believe that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover such damages. The instructions in reference to damages are given as a guide in
case you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
However, if you decide that plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages, then you must disregard the
instructions given you upon the matter of damages.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27
If you find the issues m favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, then it is your duty to
award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will
fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28
To be entitled to damages, the plaintiff must prove that damages occurred. There must be a
reasonable probability, not just speculation, that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the
negligence of the defendant.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 29
You may already know that m cases of this kind the law recognizes two kinds of damages:
"special" and "general." Special damages include such things as medical expenses, lost wages or
lost future wages (impairment of earning capacity). In this case the plaintiff does not claim any
special damages. The plaintiff, however, does claim general damages.
In awarding general damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering, both
mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has
been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously enjoyed. You may also
consider whether any of the above will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so, you
may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix reasonable
compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of
such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of damages
is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall
exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix shall be just
and reasonable in light of the evidence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide that
a party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded. It
would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, then
total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amount of your
award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount should be.
It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light of the law and
the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such individual estimates is
proper.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31
It is the duty of a person who has been injured to use reasonable diligence in caring for the
injuries and reasonable means to prevent their aggravation and to accomplish healing.
When an injured person does not use reasonable diligence to care for the injuries, and they
are aggravated as a result of such failure, the liability, if any, of another whose act or omission was a
proximate cause of the original injury must be limited to the amount of damage that would have
been suffered if the injured person had exercised the required diligence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who will
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson should not
dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the opinions of
the other members of the jury.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not be
productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of your
opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this
matter, but judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascertainment and declaration of
the truth and the administration of justice.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 34
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must decide
the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not
hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not surrender
your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35
It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In making
your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests
upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At least six
jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each
question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question, have the
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room.
You may knock on the door to let the bailiff know you have reached a verdict.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 36
I have dated and signed these instructions, and you may take them with you to the jury room
for further consideration; but I request that you return them into court with your verdict so they may
be filed in this case as required by law.
Dated this

J _ day of August, 2009.

Judge Michael D. Lyon
District Court Judge
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A,

Correct.

702-765-7100

Or as a resident at University

of Utah.
Q.

Let me just ask you about whether or not

4

this pulmonary

embolist that developed

could well

5

have come from some other location than the arm.

J

I

ll
|
r
|

I
6
7

Are you able to rule that out?
A.

I

Good question.

I
It
r

I

8

MR. SAVAGE:

It's the first one.

fe

I
9
10

MR. EPPERSON:
two good ones.

11

I'm entitled

to get one or t

Go ahead.

THE WITNESS:

|
The reason that's a good

f

12

question, counsel, is because you know the history

13

as well as I do.

I
He was in a snowmobile

accident,

J
r
r
r

I

14

developed

some phlebitis

15

|

Having said that, there was no

16

indications

17

preoperative

18

extremity

19

in his lower extremity.

from the preoperative
complaints

!

workup, from the

that he had any lower

I
J

or pelvic complaints.

J

So to get to your own statement,

if

J

20

you've got hoof beats, i.e., swelling

and pain in

21

the upper extremity,

22

until proven otherwise.

23

lower extremity, more likely than not It didn't come

24

from the lower extremities

25

did have a hip surgery and that's always a potential
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1

source of clots.

2

BY MR. EPPERSON:

702-765-7100

3

Q,

So you can't rule it out, but it's less

4

likely?

5

A.

Yes, correct.

6

Q.

In fact, you comment, well, if he had

Yes, counsel.

7

perhaps done an ultrasound

on the 28th and

8

anticoagulation

you used the comment, and I

9

I'm referring

commenced,

I?

to the bottom of page eight as you

1

I
10

follow along, it would be a quote, better chance,

1

11

end quote, to avoid a pulmonary

j

12

complication.

embolus

j

fi
13
14

Are you able to quantify this better P
chance or would that be speculative?

15

A,

No, I don't think speculation

16

anything to do with it at all, counsel.

17

that a better chance is something

18

patient.

19
20

Q.

23

had

£

I think

1

that you owe your

Can you quantify how much greater that

chance would have been in this instance?

21
22

|

A.

No.

That would be pure speculation

Q.

And despite subsequent

on my

part.
hospitalization

24

assuming had occurred and anticoagulation,

could you

25

have ruled, could you rule out the fact that this
Page 59
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1

would not have developed

2

pulmonary

embolus

MR. SAVAGE:

4

MR. EPPERSON:
hypothetical,

MR. SAVAGE:

7

MR. EPPERSON:

MR. SAVAGE:

10

is, a

—
I realize

that's

--

Developed

—

Let me restate

the

The 2 8th or any

MR. EPPERSON:

—

Let me restate

the

question.

12

THE WITNESS:

13

going,

14

BY MR. EPPERSON:

counsel,

I think

but maybe

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A,

Okay.

17

Q.

We were talking

to avoid

19

hospitalized

20

coagulated

21

guarantee

22

had the very same course,
A,

I know where

a pulmonary

about

embolus.

it.

the better

had occurred

—

still

or rule out that this patient

Counsel,

24

and I certainly

25

occurred.

would

and
wouldn't
would

And the reason

have

it?

once again, with all due

do respect

chance

But even being

and then a coagulation

assuming

you're

--

Let me try to reask

18

23

That

question.

9

11

I

but even assuming

6

8

anyway?

for this patient.

3

5

702-765-7100

you, the clotted
for the

respect
artery

hospitalization
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So I, I just don't know

1

was to treat the clot.

2

where you're going there.

3

Q.

702-765-7100

Well, your role here in part is trying

4

to, you know, with -- you have the benefit of being

5

more or less a Monday morning quarterback

6

what occurred.

7

may have been a better chance to avoid a pulmonary

8

embolus complication

f

looking at l

And you used the term well, there

with subsequent

|

hospitalization

f

I
9

and anticoagulation.

That was your report language. ft

10

A.

Yes.

I

11

Q.

I'll trying to build upon that and ask

|

12

you to clarify that.

13

made on the 28th by Dr. Bryan through

14

studies, in your mind does that rule out the, what

15

eventually

16

well have occurred anyway?

17

A.

Even if the diagnosis

1

I thought

[
f

I answered that question, but

I'll try to answer it again.

19

have occurred anyway, but once again,

20

as a physician,

21

that chance of avoiding it.
Q.

additional

occurred to this patient or could that

18

22

had been I

You're right, it could
I think that

you deserve to give your patient

I

You comment on page nine that it would

23

appear that the surgical procedures

24

right and left upper extremities

25

the standard of care.

on both the

were done within
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